Co-owners’ Rights & Duties
Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act, 2009
PART 7
Co-Ownership
Unilateral severance of a joint tenancy.
30.— (1) From the commencement of this Part, any—
( a) conveyance, or contract for a conveyance, of land held in a joint tenancy, or
( b) acquisition of another interest in such land,
by a joint tenant without the consent referred to in subsection (2) is void both at law and in equity unless such consent is dispensed with under section 31(2)(e) .
(2) In subsection (1)“consent” means the prior consent in writing of the other joint tenant or, where there are more than one other, all the other joint tenants.
(3) From the commencement of this Part, registration of a judgment mortgage against the estate or interest in land of a joint tenant does not sever the joint tenancy and if the joint tenancy remains unsevered, the judgment mortgage is extinguished upon the death of the judgment debtor.
(4) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of the court to find that all the joint tenants by mutual agreement or by their conduct have severed the joint tenancy in equity.
Court orders.
31.— (1) Any person having an estate or interest in land which is co-owned whether at law or in equity may apply to the court for an order under this section.
(2) An order under this section includes—
[PA 1868][PA 1876]
( a) an order for partition of the land amongst the co-owners,
( b) an order for the taking of an account of incumbrances affecting the land, if any, and the making of inquiries as to the respective priorities of any such incumbrances,
( c) an order for sale of the land and distribution of the proceeds of sale as the court directs,
[AJA 1707, s. 23]
( d) an order directing that accounting adjustments be made as between the co-owners,
( e) an order dispensing with consent to severance of a joint tenancy as required by section 30 where such consent is being unreasonably withheld,
( f) such other order relating to the land as appears to the court to be just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
(3) In dealing with an application for an order under subsection (1) the court may—
( a) make an order with or without conditions or other requirements attached to it, or
( b) dismiss the application without making any order, or
( c) combine more than one order under this section.
(4) In this section—
( a) “person having an estate or interest in land” includes a mortgagee or other secured creditor, a judgment mortgagee or a trustee,
( b) “accounting adjustments” include—
(i) payment of an occupation rent by a co-owner who has enjoyed, or is continuing to enjoy, occupation of the land to the exclusion of any other co-owner,
(ii) compensation to be paid by a co-owner to any other co-owner who has incurred disproportionate expenditure in respect of the land (including its repair or improvement),
(iii) contributions by a co-owner to disproportionate payments made by any other co-owner in respect of the land (including payments in respect of charges, rates, rents, taxes and other outgoings payable in respect of it),
(iv) redistribution of rents and profits received by a co-owner disproportionate to his or her interest in the land,
(v) any other adjustment necessary to achieve fairness between the co-owners.
(5) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of the court under the Act of 1976, the Act of 1995 and the Act of 1996.
(6) The equitable jurisdiction of the court to make an order for partition of land which is co-owned whether at law or in equity is abolished.
Annotations:
Modifications (not altering text):
C3
Application of section restricted (3.09.2021) by Affordable Housing Act 2021 (25/2021), s. 22(5), S.I. No. 450 of 2021.
Relationship with other enactments
22.— …
(5) Section 31 of the Conveyancing Act shall not apply in respect of the affordable dwelling equity.
…
Bodies corporate.
32.— (1) A body corporate may acquire and hold any property in a joint tenancy in the same manner as if it were an individual.
[BC(JT) A 1899]
(2) Where a body corporate and an individual or two or more bodies corporate become entitled to any property in circumstances or by virtue of any instrument which would, if the body or bodies corporate had been an individual or individuals, have created a joint tenancy, they are entitled to the property as joint tenants.
(3) On the dissolution of a body corporate which is a joint tenant of any property, the property devolves on the other surviving joint tenant or joint tenants.
Cases
Booth v Verdon
Court of Common Pleas.
5 June 1871
[1872] 6 I.L.T.R 70
Lawson, J.
It is unnecessary to consider whether this action is an action on a statute still in existence, namely, the statute of 6 Anne, c. 10. The question is, what is the statutable limitation applicable to the action? That depends upon section 20 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1853. In my opinion, it is the second clause of that section which governs this case, and it is decisive that the action must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued.
Keogh, J.
We do not quarrel with the decision of Kearney v. Kearney, but I concur with my brother Lawson that it is clear, upon the construction of the Common Law Procedure Act, section 20, that the action for not accounting must be sued within the period of six years and not twenty. We, therefore overrule the demurrer.
Treanor v Dowdall
High Court of Justice.
Meredith, M.R.
Leigh v. Dickeson (15 Q. B. D. 60) is no authority for the proposition that one of two joint tenants has any lien on the share of the other joint tenant in respect of money expended on permanent improvements, but the principle upon which the judgments proceed appear to me to apply in joint tenancy as well as in tenancy in common. The principle is that if there is an express contract proved it can be enforced, even though the parties to the contract are joint tenants and the contract is one for the expenditure by one of money on permanent improvements. It is clear one joint tenant can contract with another. It is a question of fact in each particular case, and there is no rule of law that the mere expenditure of money by one joint tenant in building on the joint estate gives him a lien or charge on the share of the other joint tenant. In this case I hold that the money was expended by Arthur Treanor at the express request of his wife, and that there was a contract that her share was to bear one half of the expenditure. I hold that Margaret Treanor joined in the mortgage to the Provincial Bank as a surety and not as a principal, and that she is entitled to stand in the shoes of the bank in so far as the mortgage debt and costs were discharged out of her estate.