Strategic Development
Planning and Development Act
PART IX
Strategic Development Zones
Interpretation.
165.—In this Part—
“development agency” means the Industrial Development Agency (Ireland), Enterprise Ireland, F689[…] Údarás na Gaeltachta, the National Building Agency Limited, F690[the Grangegorman Development Agency, F692[the Land Development Agency, a local authority or such other person as may be prescribed by the Minister for the purposes of this Part;]]
F691[“relevant public land” has the same meaning as it has in the Land Development Agency Act 2021;]
“strategic development zone” means a site or sites to which a planning scheme made under section 169 applies.
Annotations
Amendments:
F689
Deleted (5.09.2014) by State Airports (Shannon Group) Act 2014 (27/2014), s. 37(1), commenced as per s. 43 and S.I. No. 396 of 2014.
F690
Substituted (11.07.2005) by Grangegorman Development Agency Act 2005 (21/2005), s. 42, commenced on enactment.
F691
Inserted (31.03.2022) by Land Development Agency Act 2021 (26/2021), s. 78(b)(i), S.I No. 143 of 2022.
F692
Substituted (31.03.2022) by Land Development Agency Act 2021 (26/2021), s. 78(b)(ii), S.I. No 143 of 2022.
Designation of sites for strategic development zones.
166.—(1) Where, in the opinion of the Government, specified development is of economic or social importance to the State, the Government may be order, when so proposed by the Minister, designate one or more sites for the establishment, in accordance with the provisions of this Part, of a strategic development zone to facilitate such development.
(2) The Minister shall, before proposing the designation of a site or sites to the Government under subsection (1), consult with any relevant development agency or planning authority on the proposed designation.
(3) An order under subsection (1) shall—
(a) specify the development agency or development agencies for the purposes of section 168,
(b) specify the type or types of development that may be established in the strategic development zone, and
(c) state the reasons for specifying the development and for designating the site or sites.
(4) The Minister shall send a copy of any order made under this section to any relevant development agency, planning authority and F693[regional assembly] and to the Board.
(5) Development that is specified in an order under subsection (3) shall be deemed to include development that is ancillary to, or required for, the purposes of development so specified, and may include any necessary infrastructural and community facilities and services.
(6) The Government may revoke or amend an order made under this section.
F694[(7) In this section, the Land Development Agency shall not be a relevant development agency unless each site referred to in subsection (2) is wholly or partly on relevant public land or land owned by the Agency.]
Annotations
Amendments:
F693
Substituted (1.06.2014) by Local Government Reform Act 2014 (1/2014), s. 5(7) and sch. 2 part 4 ref. 82, S.I. No. 214 of 2014.
F694
Inserted (31.03.2022) by Land Development Agency Act 2021 (26/2021), s. 78(c), S.I. No. 143 of 2022.
Editorial Notes:
E299
Power pursuant to section exercised (31.05.2017) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: Ireland West Airport Knock) Order 2017 (S.I. No. 266 of 2017), in effect as per art. 1(2).
E300
Power pursuant to section exercised (18.05.2016) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: Poolbeg West, Dublin City) Order 2016 (S.I. No. 279 of 2016), in effect as per art. 1(2).
E301
Power pursuant to section exercised (20.01.2016) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: North Quays, Waterford City) Order 2016 (S.I. No. 30 of 2016), in effect as per art. 1(2).
E302
Power pursuant to section exercised (25.12.2015) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: Balgaddy-Clonburris, South Dublin County) Order 2015 (S.I. No. 604 of 2015), in effect as per art. 1(2).
E303
Power pursuant to section exercised (18.12.2012) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock) Order 2012 (S.I. No. 530 of 2012).
E304
Power pursuant to section exercised (24.05.2011) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Strategic Development Zone) (Amendment) Order 2011 (S.I. No. 243 of 2011).
E305
Power pursuant to section exercised (22.12.2010) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Strategic Development Zone) Order 2010 (S.I. No. 678 of 2010).
E306
Power pursuant to section exercised (25.05.2010) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Strategic Development Zone) (No. 2) Order 2010 (S.I. No. 540 of 2010).
E307
Power pursuant to section exercised (25.05.2010) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Strategic Development Zone: Cherrywood, Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown County) Order 2010 (S.I. No. 535 of 2010).
E308
Power pursuant to section exercised (1.07.2001) by Planning and Development Act, 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone – Clonmagadden Valley, Navan) Order 2001 (S.I. No. 274 of 2001).
E309
Power pursuant to section exercised (1.07.2001) by Planning and Development Act, 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone – Hansfield, Blanchardstown) Order 2001 (S.I. No. 273 of 2001).
E310
Power pursuant to section exercised (1.07.2001) by Planning and Development Act, 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone – Adamstown, Lucan) Order 2001 (S.I. No. 272 of 2001).
E311
Previous affecting provision: power pursuant to section exercised (31.07.2006) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: Balgaddy-Clonburris, South Dublin County) Order 2006 (S.I. No. 442 of 2006); revoked (25.12.2015) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: Balgaddy-Clonburris, South Dublin County) Order 2015 (S.I. No. 604 of 2015), art. 7, in effect as per art. 1(2).
Acquisition of site for strategic development zone.
167.—(1) A planning authority may use any powers to acquire land that are available to it under any enactment, including any powers in relation to the compulsory acquisition of land, for the purposes of providing, securing or facilitating the provision of, a site referred to in section 166(1).
(2) Where a person, other than the relevant development agency, has an interest in land, or any part of land, on which a site or sites referred to in an order under section 166(1) is or are situated, the relevant development agency may enter into an agreement with that person for the purpose of facilitating the development of the land.
(3) An agreement made under subsection (2) with any person having an interest in land may be enforced by the relevant development agency against persons deriving title under that person in respect of that land.
F695[(4) In this section, the Land Development Agency shall not be a relevant development agency unless each site referred to in section 166(2) is wholly or partly on relevant public land or land owned by the Agency.]
Annotations:
Amendments:
F695
Inserted (31.03.2022) by Land Development Agency Act 2021 (26/2021), s. 78(d), S.I. No. 143 of 2022.
Planning scheme for strategic development zones.
168.—F696[(1) Subject to subsection (1A), as soon as may be after the making of an order designating a site under section 166—
(a) the relevant development agency (other than a local authority) or, where an agreement referred to in section 167 has been made, the relevant development agency (other than a local authority) and any person who is a party to the agreement shall prepare a draft planning scheme in respect of all or any part of the site and submit it to the relevant planning authority,
(b) the local authority, where it is the development agency, or where an agreement referred to in section 167 has been made, the local authority and any person who is a party to the agreement shall prepare a draft planning scheme in respect of all or any part of the site.
(1A) The first draft planning scheme under subsection (1) in respect of all or any part of a site designated under section 166, shall be prepared not later than 2 years after the making of the order so designating the site.]
(2) F696[A draft planning scheme under this section shall consist of a written statement and a plan indicating the manner in which it is intended that the site or part of the site designated under section 166 to which the scheme relates is to be developed and in particular—]
(a) the type or types of development which may be permitted to establish on the site (subject to the order of the Government under section 166),
(b) the extent of any such proposed development,
(c) proposals in relation to the overall design of the proposed development, including the maximum heights, the external finishes of structures and the general appearance and design,
(d) proposals relating to transportation, including public transportation, the roads layout, the provision of parking spaces and traffic management,
(e) proposals relating to the provision of services on the site, including the provision of waste and sewerage facilities and water, electricity and telecommunications services, oil and gas pipelines, including storage facilities for oil or gas,
(f) proposals relating to minimising any adverse effects on the environment, including the natural and built environment, and on the amenities of the area, and
(g) where the scheme provides for residential development, proposals relating to the provision of amenities, facilities and services for the community, including schools, créches and other education and childcare services.
F697[(3) The Minister may, for the purposes of giving effect to Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (No. 2001/42/EC, O.J. No. L 197, 21 July 2001 P. 0030 – 0037), by regulations make provision in relation to consideration of the likely significant effects on the environment of implementing a planning scheme.]
F698[(3A) A screening for appropriate assessment and, if required, an appropriate assessment of a draft planning scheme shall be carried out in accordance with Part XAB.]
(4) (a) A draft planning scheme for residential development shall be consistent with the housing strategy prepared by the planning authority in accordance with Part V.
(b) Where land in a strategic development zone is to be used for residential development, an objective to secure the implementation of the housing strategy shall be included in the draft planning scheme as if it were a specific objective under section 95(1)(b).
(5) Where an area designated under section 166 is situated within the functional area of two or more planning authorities the functions conferred on a planning authority under this Part shall be exercised—
(a) jointly by the planning authorities concerned, or
(b) by one of the authorities, provided that the consent of the other authority or authorities, as appropriate, is obtained prior to the making of the scheme under section 169,
and the words “planning authority” shall be construed accordingly.
F699[(6) In this section, the Land Development Agency shall not be a relevant development agency unless each site referred to in subsection (1) is wholly or partly on relevant public land or land owned by the Agency.]
Annotations
Amendments:
F696
Substituted (5.10.2010) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 (30/2010), s. 50(a) and (b), S.I. No. 477 of 2010.
F697
Substituted (14.07.2004) by European Communities (Environmental Assessment of Certain Plans and Programmes) Regulations 2004 (S.I. No. 435 of 2004), reg. 8.
F698
Substituted (29.12.2015) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2015 (63/2015), s. 4, commenced on enactment.
F699
Inserted (31.03.2022) by Land Development Agency Act 2021 (26/2021), s. 78(e), S.I. No. 143 of 2022.
Editorial Notes:
E312
Power pursuant to subs. (3) exercised (18.12.2012) by Planning and Development Act 2000 (Designation of Strategic Development Zone: North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock) Order 2012 (S.I. No. 530 of 2012).
E313
Power pursuant to subs. (3) exercised (3.05.2011) by Planning and Development (Strategic Environmental Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 201 of 2011).
E314
Power pursuant to subs. (3) exercised (21.07.2004) by Planning and Development (Strategic Environmental Assessment) Regulations 2004 (S.I. No. 436 of 2004).
E315
Previous affecting provision: subs. (3A) inserted (21.09.2011) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 (30/2010), s. 50(c), S.I. No. 475 of 2011; substituted as per F-note above.
Making of planning scheme.
169.—(1) Where a draft planning scheme has been prepared and submitted to the planning authority in accordance with section 168, the planning authority shall, as soon as may be—
(a) send notice and copies of the draft scheme to the Minister, the Board and the prescribed authorities,
(b) publish notice of the preparation of the draft scheme in one or more newspapers circulating in its area.
(2) A notice under subsection (1) shall state—
(a) that a copy of the draft may be inspected at a stated place or places and at stated times during a stated period of not less than 6 weeks (and the copy shall be kept available for inspection accordingly), and
(b) that written submissions or observations with respect to the draft scheme made to the planning authority within the stated period will be taken into consideration in deciding upon the scheme.
(3) (a) Not longer than 12 weeks after giving notice under subsection (2) the F700[chief executive] of a planning authority shall prepare a report on any submissions or observations received under that subsection and submit the report to the members of the authority for their consideration.
(b) A report under paragraph (a) shall—
F701[(i) list the persons or bodies who made submissions or observations for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2),]
(ii) summarise the issues raised by the persons or bodies in the submissions or observations,
(iii) give the response of the F700[chief executive] to the issues raised, taking account of the proper planning and sustainable development of the area, the statutory obligations of any local authority in the area and any relevant policies or objectives for the time being of the Government or of any Minister of the Government.
(4) (a) The members of a planning authority shall consider the draft planning scheme and the report of the F700[chief executive] prepared and submitted in accordance with subsection (3).
F702[(b) The draft planning scheme shall be deemed to be made 6 weeks after the submission of that draft planning scheme and report to the members of the planning authority in accordance with subsection (3) unless the planning authority decides, by resolution, to—
(i) make, subject to variations and modifications, the draft planning scheme (and the passing of such a resolution shall be subject to paragraphs (ba) and (be)), or
(ii) not to make the draft planning scheme.
(ba) The planning authority shall determine if a strategic environmental assessment or an appropriate assessment or both such assessments, as the case may be, is or are to be carried out as respects one or more than one proposed variation or modification that would, if made, be a material alteration of the draft planning scheme.
(bb) The F700[chief executive] shall, not later than 2 weeks after a determination under paragraph (ba) specify such period as he or she considers necessary following the determination as being required to facilitate an assessment referred to in paragraph (ba).
(bc) The planning authority shall publish notice of the proposed material alteration, and where appropriate in the circumstances, the making of a determination that an assessment referred to in paragraph (ba) is required, in at least one newspaper circulating in its area.
(bd) The notice referred to in paragraph (bc) shall state—
(i) that a copy of the proposed material alteration and of any determination by the authority that an assessment referred to in paragraph (ba) is required may be inspected at a stated place or places and at stated times, and on the authority’s website, during a stated period of not less than 4 weeks (and that copies will be kept for inspection accordingly), and
(ii) that written submissions or observations with respect to the proposed material alteration or an assessment referred to in paragraph (ba) and made to the planning authority within a stated period shall be taken into account by the authority before the draft planning scheme is made.
(be) The planning authority shall carry out an assessment referred to in paragraph (ba) of the proposed material alteration of the draft planning scheme within the period specified by the F700[chief executive].]
(c) Where a draft planning scheme is—
(i) deemed, in accordance with paragraph (b), to have been made, or
(ii) made in accordance with paragraph (b)(i),
it shall have effect 4 weeks from the date of such making unless an appeal is brought to the Board under subsection (6).
(5) (a) Following the decision of the planning authority under subsection (4) the authority shall, as soon as may be, and in any case not later than 6 working days following the making of the decision—
(i) give notice of the decision of the planning authority to the Minister, the Board, the prescribed authorities and any person who made written submissions or observations on the draft scheme, and
(ii) publish notice of the decision in one or more newspapers circulating in its area.
(b) A notice under paragraph (a) shall—
(i) give the date of the decision of the planning authority in respect of the draft planning scheme,
(ii) state the nature of the decision,
(iii) state that a copy of the planning scheme is available for inspection at a stated place or places (and the copy shall be kept available for inspection accordingly),
(iv) state that any person who made submissions or observation regarding the draft scheme may appeal the decision of the planning authority to the Board within 4 weeks of the date of the planning authority’s decision, and
(v) contain such other information as may be prescribed.
(6) The development agency or any person who made submissions or observations in respect of the draft planning scheme may, for stated reasons, within 4 weeks of the date of the decision of the planning authority appeal the decision of the planning authority to the Board.
F701[(7) (a) Following consideration of an appeal made under this section, the Board may—
(i) subject to paragraph (b) and (c) and subsection (7A), approve the making of the planning scheme, with or without any modifications, or
(ii) refuse to approve the making of the planning scheme.
(b) Except where otherwise provided for by and in accordance with paragraph (c) and subsection (7A), the Board shall not approve, on an appeal under this section, a planning scheme with a modification where it determines that the making of the modification would constitute the making of a material change in the overall objectives of the planning scheme concerned.
(c) If the Board determines that the making of a modification to which, but for this paragraph, paragraph (b) would apply—
(i) is a change of a minor nature and not likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC1 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment) or on a European site, then it may approve the planning scheme with such a modification and notify the planning authority or each planning authority for the area or areas concerned, of the modification, or
(ii) constitutes the making of a material change but would not constitute a change in the overall objectives of the planning scheme concerned, then, subject to subsection (7A), it shall approve the planning scheme with such modification.
(d) Where the Board approves the making of a planning scheme in accordance with paragraph (a) or (c), the planning authority shall, as soon as practicable, publish notice of the approval of the scheme in at least one newspaper circulating in its area, and shall state that a copy of the planning scheme is available for inspection at a stated place or places, a copy of which shall be made available for inspection accordingly.]
F703[(7A) (a) Before making a decision under subsection (7)(c)(ii) in respect of a planning scheme, the Board shall—
(i) determine whether the extent and character of the modification it is considering are such that the modification, if it were made, would be likely to have a significant effect on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) or on a European site, and
(ii) for the purpose of so determining, the Board shall have reached a final decision as to what is the extent and character of any alternative amendment, the making of which it is also considering.
(b) If the Board determines that the making of a modification referred to in subsection (7)(c)(ii) —
(i) is not likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) or on a European site, then it may approve the planning scheme concerned with the modification, or
(ii) is likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) 2 or on a European site, then it shall require the relevant planning authority to undertake a strategic environmental assessment or an appropriate assessment or both such assessments, as the case may be, in relation to the making of the proposed modification.
(c) Before making a determination under subsection (7)(c)(ii), the Board shall require the relevant planning authority—
(i) to send notice and copies of the proposed modification of the planning scheme concerned to the Minister and the prescribed authorities, and
(ii) to publish a notice of the proposed modification of the planning scheme concerned in one or more newspapers circulating in that area,
and every such notice shall state—
(I) the reason or reasons for the proposed modification,
(II) that a copy of the proposed modification, along with any assessment undertaken in accordance with paragraph (b)(ii), may be inspected at a stated place or places and at stated times during a stated period of not less than 4 weeks, and
(III) that written submissions or observations with respect to the proposed modification may be made to the planning authority within the stated period, being a period of not less than 4 weeks, and any such submissions or observations will be taken into consideration before making a decision on the proposed modification,
and the copy of the proposed modification shall be made available for inspection accordingly.
(d) Not later than 8 weeks after giving notice under paragraph (c), or such additional time as may be required to complete any assessment that may be required pursuant to subsection (7A)(b)(ii) and agreed with the Board, the planning authority shall prepare a report on any submissions or observations received as a consequence of that notice and shall submit the report to the Board for its consideration.
(e) A report under paragraph (d) shall—
(i) list the persons or bodies who made submissions or observations for the purposes of paragraph (c)(III),
(ii) summarise the issues raised in the submissions or observations so made,
(iii) include, where and if required for the purposes of subsection (7A)(b)(ii), either or both—
(I) the environmental report and strategic environmental assessment, and
(II) the Natura impact report and appropriate assessment,
of the planning authority, and
(iv) give the response of the planning authority to the issues raised, taking account of the proper planning and sustainable development of the area, the overall objectives of the planning scheme, the statutory obligations of any local authority in the area and any relevant policies or objectives for the time being of the Government or of any Minister of the Government.
(f) Where a report has been submitted to the Board under paragraph (d), the planning authority concerned shall, upon being requested by the Board, provide it with copies of such submissions or observations to which that paragraph relates as are so requested.
(g) The Board shall have regard to any report prepared in accordance with paragraphs (d) and (e), and
(h) Subject to any obligations that may arise under Part XAB, if the Board makes a determination to make a modification as referred to in subsection (7)(c)(ii), it shall—
(i) approve the planning scheme with the modification accordingly,
(ii) notify the planning authority or each planning authority for the area or areas concerned of the modification, and
(iii) notify any person who made a submission or observation in accordance with paragraph (c)(III) of the determination under subsection (7)(c).]
(8) In considering a draft planning scheme under this section a planning authority or the Board, as the case may be, shall consider the proper planning and sustainable development of the area and consider the provisions of the development plan, the provisions of the housing strategy, F704[any specific planning policy requirements contained in guidelines under subsection (1) of section 28,] the provisions of any special amenity area order or the conservation and preservation of any European Site and, where appropriate—
(a) the effect the scheme would have on any neighbouring land to the land concerned,
(b) the effect the scheme would have on any place which is outside the area of the planning authority, and
(c) any other consideration relating to development outside the area of the planning authority, including any area outside the State.
F704[(8A) (a) A planning scheme that contains a provision that contravenes any specific planning policy requirement in guidelines under subsection (1) of section 28 shall be deemed to have been made, under paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of section 169, subject to the deletion of that provision.
(b) Where a planning scheme contravenes a specific planning policy requirement in guidelines under subsection (1) of section 28 by omission of a provision in compliance with that requirement, the planning scheme shall be deemed to have been made under paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of section 169 subject to the addition of that provision.]
(9) A planning scheme made under this section shall be deemed to form part of any development plan in force in the area of the scheme until the scheme is revoked, and any contrary provisions of the development plan shall be superseded.
Annotations
Amendments:
F700
Substituted (22.10.2018) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2018 (16/2018), s. 6(1) and sch. 2 ref. nos. 63, 64, S.I. No. 436 of 2018.
F701
Substituted (29.12.2015) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2015 (63/2015), s. 5(a), (b), commenced on enactment.
F702
Substituted and inserted (5.10.2010) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 (30/2010), s. 51, S.I. No. 477 of 2010.
F703
Inserted (29.12.2015) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2015 (63/2015), s. 5(b), commenced on enactment.
F704
Inserted (22.10.2018) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2018 (16/2018), s. 31(a), (b), S.I. No. 436 of 2018.
Editorial Notes:
E316
Deciding to make, subject to variations and modifications, or deciding not to make a draft planning scheme for strategic development zones is a reserved function of local authorities as provided by Local Government Act 2001 (37/2001), ss. 131, 131A and sch. 14A part 3 item 73 as inserted (1.06.2014) by Local Government Reform Act 2014 (1/2014), s. 41(4) and sch. 3, S.I. No. 214 of 2014.
E317
Power pursuant to section exercised (1.01.2014) by Planning and Development (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 (S.I. No. 520 of 2013).
E318
Power pursuant to section exercised (21.12.2006, 31.01.2007 and 31.03.2007) by Planning and Development Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 685 of 2006).
E319
Power pursuant to section exercised (21.01.2002 and 11.03.2002) by Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (S.I. No. 600 of 2001).
E320
Previous affecting provision: power pursuant to section exercised (1.11.2000) by Planning and Development Regulations 2000 (S.I. No. 350 of 2000); revoked (21.01.2002) by Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (S.I. No. 600 of 2001), reg. 4 and sch. 1.
E321
Previous affecting provision: subs. (7)(a) substituted and (aa) inserted (5.10.2010) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 (30/2010), s. 51, S.I. No. 477 of 2010; substituted as per F-note above.
1O.J. No. L197, 21.7.2001 p.30
2O.J. No. L197, 21.7.2001 p.30
Application for development in strategic development zone.
170.—(1) Where an application is made to a planning authority under section 34 for a development in a strategic development zone, that section and any permission regulations shall apply, subject to the other provisions of this section.
(2) F705[Subject to the provisions of Part X or Part XAB, or both of those Parts as appropriate, a planning authority shall] grant permission in respect of an application for a development in a strategic development zone where it is satisfied that the development, where carried out in accordance with the application or subject to any conditions which the planning authority may attach to a permission, would be consistent with any planning scheme in force for the land in question, and no permission shall be granted for any development which would not be consistent with such a planning scheme.
(3) Notwithstanding section 37, no appeal shall lie to the Board against a decision of a planning authority on an application for permission in respect of a development in a strategic development zone.
(4) Where the planning authority decides to grant permission for a development in a strategic development zone, the grant shall be deemed to be given on the date of the decision.
Annotations
Amendments:
F705
Substituted (21.09.2011) by Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 (20/2011), s. 30, S.I. No. 474 of 2011.
Editorial Notes:
E322
Previous affecting provision: subs. (2) amended by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 (30/2010), s. 52, not commenced; repealed (21.09.2011) by Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 (20/2011), s. 42, S.I. No. 474 of 2011.
F706[
Amendment of planning scheme.
170A. (1) A planning authority may, on its own behalf where it is promoting a planning scheme, or on behalf of a development agency which is promoting a planning scheme, make an application to the Board to request an amendment under this section to a planning scheme.
(2) Where an application under subsection (1) has been made, the Board shall make a decision, in a manner provided for by this section, as to whether the making of the amendment to which the request relates would constitute the making of a material change to the planning scheme.
(3) (a) Where the amendment F707[fails to satisfy] each of the criteria referred to in subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of paragraph (b) F708[…], the Board shall require the planning authority to amend the planning scheme in compliance with the procedure laid down in section 169 and that section shall be construed and have effect accordingly.
(b) The criteria referred to in paragraph (a) are that the amendment to the planning scheme concerned—
(i) would not constitute a change in the overall objectives of the planning scheme concerned,
(ii) would not relate to already developed land in the planning scheme,
F709[(iii) would not significantly increase or decrease the overall floor area or density of proposed development, and
(iv) would not adversely affect or diminish the amenity of the area that is the subject of the proposed amendment.]
(v) F710[…]
(4) If the Board determines that the making of the amendment to a planning scheme—
(a) is a change of a minor nature and not likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment) or on a European site, then it may approve the making of the amendment to the planning scheme and notify the planning authority or each planning authority for the area or areas concerned, of the amendment, or
(b) constitutes the making of a material change but is within the criteria set out in subsection (3)(b), then, subject to subsection (5), it may approve the making of the amendment to the planning scheme with such amendment, or an alternate amendment, being an amendment that would be different from that to which the request relates but would not represent, in the opinion of the Board, a more significant change than that which was proposed.
(5) Before making a determination to which subsection (4)(b) would relate, the Board shall establish whether or not the extent and character—
(a) of the amendment to which subsection (1) relates, and
(b) of any alternative amendment it is considering and to which subsection (4)(b) relates,
are such that, if the amendment were to be made, it would be likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) or on a European site and, for that purpose, the Board shall have reached a final decision as to what is the extent and character of any alternative amendment, the making of which it is also considering.
(6) If the Board determines that the making of either kind of amendment referred to in subsection (4)(b) —
(a) is not likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) or on a European site, it shall proceed to make a determination under subsection (4)(b), or
(b) is likely to have significant effects on the environment (within the meaning of Annex II of Directive 2001/42/EC) or on a European site, then it shall require the planning authority to undertake a strategic environmental assessment or an appropriate assessment or both such assessments, as the case may be, in relation to the making of the proposed amendment or alternative amendment.
(7) Before making a determination to which subsection (4)(b) would relate, the Board shall require the planning authority concerned—
(a) to send notice and copies of the proposed amendment of the planning scheme concerned to the Minister and the prescribed authorities, and
(b) to publish a notice of that proposed amendment in one or more newspapers circulating in the area concerned,
and every such notice shall state—
(i) the reason or reasons for the proposed amendment,
(ii) that a copy of the proposed amendment, along with any assessment undertaken according to subsection (6)(b), may be inspected at a stated place or places and at stated times during a stated period of not less than 4 weeks, and
(iii) that written submissions or observations with respect to the proposed amendment may be made to the planning authority within the stated period, being a period of not less than 4 weeks, and any such submissions or observations will be taken into consideration before making a decision on the proposed amendment,
and the copy of the proposed amendment shall be made available for inspection accordingly.
(8) Not later than 8 weeks after giving notice under subsection (7), or such additional time as may be required to complete any assessment that may be required pursuant to subsection (6)(b) and agreed with the Board, the planning authority shall prepare a report on any submissions or observations received as a consequence of that notice and shall submit the report to the Board for its consideration.
(9) A report under subsection (8) shall—
(a) list the persons or bodies who made submissions or observations for the purposes of subsection (7)(iii),
(b) summarise the issues raised in the submissions or observations so made,
(c) include, where and if required for the purposes of subsection (6)(b), either or both—
(i) the environmental report and strategic environmental assessment, and
(ii) the Natura impact report and appropriate assessment,
of the planning authority, and
(d) give the response of the planning authority to the issues raised, taking account of the proper planning and sustainable development of the area, the overall objectives of the planning scheme, the statutory obligations of any local authority in the area and any relevant policies or objectives for the time being of the Government or of any Minister of the Government.
(10) The Board shall have regard to any report prepared in accordance with subsections (8) and (9).
(11) Subject to any obligations that may arise under Part XAB, if the Board makes a determination to make an amendment of any kind referred to in subsection (4), it shall—
(a) approve the making of an amendment to the planning scheme accordingly,
(b) notify the planning authority or each planning authority for the area or areas concerned of the amendment, and
(c) notify any person who made a submission or observation in accordance subsection (7)(iii) of its determination under subsection (4).
(12) The amendment of a planning scheme shall not prejudice the validity of any planning permission granted or anything done in accordance with the terms of the scheme before it was amended except in accordance with the terms of this Act.
(13) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (12), sections 40 and 42 shall apply to any permission granted under this Part.]
Annotations
Amendments:
F706
Inserted (29.12.2015) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2015 (63/2015), s. 6, commenced on enactment.
F707
Substituted (28.12.2016) by Courts Act 2016 (22/2016), s. 5(a), commenced on enactment.
F708
Deleted (28.12.2016) by Courts Act 2016 (22/2016), s. 5(a), commenced on enactment.
F709
Substituted (28.12.2016) by Courts Act 2016 (22/2016), s. 5(b), commenced on enactment.
F710
Deleted (28.12.2016) by Courts Act 2016 (22/2016), s. 5(b), commenced on enactment.
Editorial Notes:
E323
The section heading is taken from the amending section in the absence of one included in the amendment.
Revocation of planning scheme.
F711[171. (1) A planning authority may by resolution, with the consent of the relevant development agency, revoke a planning scheme made under this Part.
(2) Notice of the revocation of a planning scheme under this section shall be given in at least one newspaper circulating in the area of the planning authority.
(3) The revocation of a planning scheme shall not prejudice the validity of any planning permission granted or anything done in accordance with the terms of the scheme before it was revoked except in accordance with the terms of this Act.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (3), sections 40 and 42 shall apply to any permission granted under this Part.]
Annotations
Amendments:
F711
Substituted (29.12.2015) by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2015 (63/2015), s. 7, commenced on enactment.
Editorial Notes:
E324
Amending or revoking a planning scheme for strategic development zones is a reserved function of local authorities as provided by Local Government Act 2001 (37/2001), ss. 131, 131A and sch. 14A part 3 item 74 as inserted (1.06.2014) by Local Government Reform Act 2014 (1/2014), s. 41(4) and sch. 3, S.I. No. 214 of 2014.
Cases
Redmond v An Bord Pleanala
[2020] IEHC 151 (10 March 2020)
INTRODUCTION1. The within proceedings seek to question the validity of a decision of An Bord Pleanála togrant planning permission for a large scale residential development (134 units). Thedecision to grant planning permission was made on 10 May 2019, and bears the An BordPleanála reference “PL06D.304420”.2. The impugned decision was made pursuant to the special statutory procedure whichgoverns applications for “strategic housing development” (as defined). One of the keyfeatures of this procedure is that the application for planning permission is made to AnBord Pleanála directly, i.e. there is no first-instance application to the local planningauthority.3. Notwithstanding that the planning authority does not have a formal decision-makingfunction in respect of such applications, the authority continues to have a significant roleto play. First, it is a statutory consultee and An Bord Pleanála is required to consider thereport and recommendation prepared on behalf of the planning authority by its chiefexecutive. Secondly, An Bord Pleanála must have regard to the planning authority’sdevelopment plan in determining the application for planning permission. The board isprecluded from granting planning permission if the proposed development would involve amaterial contravention of a zoning objective of the development plan or local area plan.In the case of a non-zoning objective, i.e. an objective other than one in relation to thezoning of land, the board has jurisdiction to grant planning permission in materialcontravention of the objective provided that certain prescribed statutory criteria arefulfilled.4. The principal issue which arises for determination in this judgment is whether the lands,the subject-matter of the planning application, are designated as “institutional lands”under the development plan. If this designation is held to apply, then a number ofsubsidiary issues arise for determination by the court, including (i) whether thedesignation represents a zoning objective, and (ii) whether the proposed developmentconstitutes a material contravention of the development plan objectives applicable to“institutional lands”.5. This judgment will also address a number of separate grounds of challenge which havebeen advanced by the applicant for judicial review. The legal issues presented by theseother grounds can be disposed of more shortly. The lion’s share of this judgment will betaken up with the issues identified in the preceding paragraph.NOMENCLATURE6. The following shorthand will be used to describe the parties to the proceedings. Theapplicant for judicial review, Mr Michael Redmond, will be referred to as “the objector”.The applicant for planning permission, Durkan Estates Clonskeagh Ltd., will be referred toas “the developer”. (The use of the term “applicant” to describe either of these partieswill be avoided as it is apt to lead to confusion between the applicant for judicial review,and the applicant for planning permission). The decision-maker, An Bord Pleanála, will bePage 3 ⇓referred to as either “An Bord Pleanála” or “the board”. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown CountyCouncil will be referred to as “the planning authority”.7. The underlying legislation, the Planning and Development Act 2000, and the Planning andDevelopment (Housing) Act 2016, will be referred to by the abbreviations “PDA 2000” and“PD(H)A 2016”.8. The lands the subject-matter of the planning permission impugned in these proceedingswill be referred to as “the application site”.9. The development plan imposes certain policies and objectives in the case of what aredescribed as lands in “institutional use” or “institutional lands”. The relevant provisions ofthe 2016–2022 development plan are set out in an appendix to this judgment. I will referto lands subject to these policies and objectives as lands which have been “designated” as“institutional lands”. The term “designated” is employed in contradistinction to the term“zoned”. This is because, as explained at paragraph 60 et seq., the objectives andpolicies do not amount to a zoning objective.THE APPLICATION SITE10. The application site is located in Goatstown, some 5 kilometres from Dublin city centre,and is in the functional area of Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council. The generalarea in the vicinity of the application site is primarily in residential use. The applicationsite itself measures some 1.969 hectares. The application site had previously formed partof an overall landholding of 6.4 hectares which had been in the ownership of theCongregation of Religious of Jesus and Mary (“the religious congregation”). Thedeveloper purchased the application site from the religious congregation in October 2017.The precise relationship between the application site and the overall landholding is one ofthe central issues in dispute in these proceedings.11. The religious congregation had previously sold another part of the overall landholding tothe same developer. A residential development known as “The Grove” has been erectedon these lands.12. The balance of the overall landholding which remains in the ownership of the religiouscongregation accommodates (i) a secondary school (Jesus and Mary College); (ii) aprimary school (Our Lady’s Grove Primary School); (iii) a new four-storey conventbuilding (Errew House); (iv) a hockey pitch; and (v) tennis courts. The hockey pitch hadoriginally run north-south, and had straddled part of the application site. An BordPleanála issued a (separate) grant of planning permission on 14 March 2019 whichauthorised the development of a new all-weather hockey pitch on an east-west alignment.This new pitch has since been installed, with the result that no part of the new hockeypitch lies within the application site. Rather, the new hockey pitch is located on landswithin the continued ownership of the congregation.“INSTITUTIONAL LANDS” DESIGNATION13. It is evident from the positions adopted by the parties in their respective pleadings andlegal submissions that the principal dispute between them centres on the interpretation ofPage 4 ⇓the Dun Laoghaire Rathdown Development Plan 2016–2020 (“the 2016–2020development plan”). More specifically, the parties are divided on the question of whetherthe application site is subject to the “institutional lands” designation. If this designationdoes apply, then An Bord Pleanála would have been required to have regard to certainpolicies and objectives in determining the planning application. In particular, it wouldhave had to have regard to objectives in respect of (i) the density of the proposeddevelopment (dwellings per hectare); (ii) the provision of open space; (iii) the retentionof trees; and (iv) the retention of sufficient space for possible future school expansion orredevelopment. Unless certain statutory criteria were met, the board would be precludedfrom granting planning permission for the proposed development if it constituted amaterial contravention of these policies and objectives.14. The position adopted by the objector, Mr. Redmond, is that the “institutional lands”designation does apply. Conversely, An Bord Pleanála and the developer submit that thedesignation does not apply, and further submit that, even if it did apply, An Bord Pleanálahad assessed the proposed development by reference to the relevant objectives in anyevent.15. In order to resolve this dispute, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the2016–2022 development plan (both in terms of the written statement and maps). Beforeturning to that task, however, it is necessary first to consider the legal principles whichgovern the interpretation of a development plan.INTERPRETATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN: LEGAL PRINCIPLES16. The approach to be adopted in interpreting a development plan is well established. Theprovisions of the plan fall to be interpreted as they would be understood by a reasonablyintelligent person, having no particular expertise in law or town planning. See Tennysonv. Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] 2 I.R. 527 at 535. This is the same legal test whichapplies to the interpretation of planning decisions as set out by the Supreme Court in InRe XJS Investments Ltd [1986] I.R. 750.17. The parties were all in agreement that this is the correct approach. The parties citedmore recent case law where this approach has been endorsed, including, in particular, thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Lanigan v. Barry [2016] IESC 46; [2016] 1 I.R. 656(interpretation of planning permission), and the judgments of the High Court in HeatherHill Management Company clg v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2019] IEHC 450 and SpencerPlace Development Company Ltd v. Dublin City Council [2019] IEHC 384.18. There was, however, disagreement between the parties as to the extent, if any, to whichit is legitimate for a court to have regard to materials outside of the development plan ininterpreting the plan. The developer submitted that it was legitimate to have regard toearlier development plans in interpreting the 2016–2022 development plan. In particular,it was submitted that the documentary record of the statutory procedure leading up tothe making of the 2010–2016 development plan explained the significance of the changein the location of the symbol, which designates lands in “institutional use”, as between the2010–2016 plan and its precursor, namely, the 2004–2010 development plan. ThePage 5 ⇓manager’s report in respect of the process leading up to the making of the 2010–2016plan indicated that the symbol had been repositioned to “the northeast corner of thedefined site to more accurately reflect the residual bona fide institutional use remainingon the site”. (See affidavit of Julie Costello, paragraph 31 and exhibit JC10). (As anaside, it should be noted that, whatever the authority’s position may have been in 2010,it is evident from the chief executive’s report that the planning authority is now firmly ofthe view that the designation applies to the application site).19. With respect, this submission seeks to attribute far too great a knowledge to thehypothetical “reasonably intelligent person”. The case law indicates that a developmentplan is to be interpreted as it would be by a person who has no particular expertise in lawor town planning. Whereas such a person can be assumed to have read the extantdevelopment plan, it is unrealistic to assume that he or she would have gone further andsought out copies of the previous development plan and of the documentation leading upto the making of that plan. This would entail a level of knowledge which is the exclusivepreserve of those with a professional role in town planning, i.e. planning consultants orlawyers.20. It would also be inconsistent with effective public participation, as required under nationaland EU law, to impose an obligation on a member of the public, who wishes tounderstand current planning policy, to have to read not only the extant developmentplan—the contents of which often run to hundreds of pages—but also to have to readprevious development plans and the statutory reports associated with the making ofthose earlier development plans. This would place an unrealistic burden on members ofthe public.21. The 2016–2022 development plan thus falls to be interpreted without reference to the2010–2016 development plan.INTERPRETATION IS A QUESTION OF LAW FOR THE COURT22. Before turning to consider the provisions of the 2016–2022 development plan in detail, itis necessary first to say something about the standard of review which the court isrequired to apply in interpreting a statutory development plan. The parties all agree thatthe general rule is that the interpretation of a plan is a question of law, and, accordingly,the court is not required to show deference to the views of An Bord Pleanála (or even tothe views of the local planning authority who is the author of the plan).23. It is important to understand the rationale underlying this principle that the interpretationof a development plan is a question of law for the court. The rationale is predicated onthe legal effect of a development plan, and, in particular, the manner in which it acts as afetter on the discretion of An Bord Pleanála. An Bord Pleanála enjoys a broad discretionin determining planning applications, and its decision on whether proposed developmentis in accordance with proper planning and sustainable development is subject only to themost limited merits-based review under the principles in O’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála[1993] 1 I.R. 39. The board is, however, required to “have regard to” the provisions ofthe relevant development plan. Further, there are statutory restrictions on the board’sPage 6 ⇓jurisdiction to grant planning permission for proposed development in materialcontravention of the development plan. These statutory restrictions are stricter in thecase of a “strategic housing development” application under the PD(H)A 2016 than theyare in the case of a conventional planning application. The board cannot grant planningpermission under the PD(H)A 2016 where the proposed development, or a part of it,contravenes materially the development plan in relation to the zoning of the land. Thisdifference in treatment between a “strategic housing development” application and aconventional application is, presumably, intended to reflect the fact that an application ofthe former type is made directly to An Bord Pleanála without there being any first-instance application to the planning authority. The enhanced status afforded to thezoning objectives ensures that the planning authority’s role, as author of the developmentplan, in setting planning policy, is respected. As to the role of a local planning authorityin making policy, see, generally, Christian v. Dublin City Council (No. 1) [2012] IEHC 163;[2012] 2 I.R. 506, [62].“[…] However, for the reasons already analysed, a development plan contains atleast a significant element of what might legitimately be described as policyformation. It is, of course, the fact that there are limits on the range of policyoptions which can be adopted by a local authority for the purposes of formulatingits development plan. The development plan must conform with the legislation. Itmust be designed and set out with ‘an overall strategy for the proper planning andsustainable development’ of the relevant area (s. 10(1) of the Act of 2000). Itmust conform with the overall policy objectives mandated by the legislation (suchas have been described earlier in this judgment). Within those very generalobligations a great deal of discretion is left to the local authority and it does notseem to me to be unreasonable to describe the breadth of that discretion asamounting to an express, and constitutionally permissible, conferral of at least adegree of policy- making discretion on the local authority concerned.”24. Insofar as non-zoning objectives are concerned, An Bord Pleanála may only grantplanning permission in material contravention of a development plan by reference to thestatutory criteria under section 37(2)(b) of the PDA 2000. (See section 9(6)(c) of thePD(H)A 2016). These criteria read as follows:(i) the proposed development is of strategic or national importance;(ii) there are conflicting objectives in the development plan or the objectives are notclearly stated, insofar as the proposed development is concerned;(iii) permission for the proposed development should be granted having regard toregional spatial and economic strategy for the area, guidelines under section 28,policy directives under section 29, the statutory obligations of any local authority inthe area, and any relevant policy of the Government, the Minister or any Minister ofthe Government;Page 7 ⇓(iv) permission for the proposed development should be granted having regard to thepattern of development, and permissions granted, in the area since the making ofthe development plan.25. It follows from this legislative scheme that the question of whether or not a proposedstrategic housing development involves a material contravention of the development planmust be a question of law exclusively for the court. Were it otherwise—and were An BordPleanála to be allowed to determine conclusively whether or not a material contraventionis involved—then this would set at naught the statutory restraints on An Bord Pleanála’sability to grant planning permission which are imposed by section 9(6) of the PD(H)A2016. The board would, in effect, be allowed to determine its own jurisdiction.26. Of course, An Bord Pleanála will, as a matter of daily practice, have to take a view on theinterpretation of development plans as part of its decision-making on individual planningappeals and applications. This is entirely proper. There is no suggestion that the boardhas to pause, and refer the question of interpretation to the High Court. Rather, the pointof the above analysis is that, in the event that a planning decision is challenged by way ofjudicial review, then An Bord Pleanála’s view on the interpretation of the plan is subject tofull-blooded review, and not the attenuated form of review under the principles inO’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39.27. In some instances, objectives of a development plan will—on their correct interpretation—be formulated in broad terms, and it will be a matter of planning judgment as to how toapply those objectives to any given planning application. However, the correctinterpretation of a development plan is always a logically anterior question to theapplication of the plan’s objectives in the assessment of any particular developmentproposal. This point is illustrated by the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in TescoStores Ltd. v. Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13, [21].“A provision in the development plan which requires an assessment of whether asite is ‘suitable’ for a particular purpose calls for judgment in its application. Butthe question whether such a provision is concerned with suitability for one purposeor another is not a question of planning judgment: it is a question of textualinterpretation, which can only be answered by construing the language used in itscontext. In the present case, in particular, the question whether the word ‘suitable,in the policies in question, means ‘suitable for the development proposed by theapplicant’, or ‘suitable for meeting identified deficiencies in retail provision in thearea’, is not a question which can be answered by the exercise of planningjudgment: it is a logically prior question as to the issue to which planning judgmentrequires to be directed.”28. The judgment in Tesco Stores Ltd. has been cited with approval by the High Court inNavan Co-ownership v. An Bord Pleanála [2016] IEHC 181 and Kelly v. An Bord Pleanála[2019] IEHC 84 (“Kelly (Aldi Laytown”)).DOES THE DESIGNATION APPLY TO THE APPLICATION SITE?Page 8 ⇓29. The 2016–2022 development plan comprises a written statement, consisting of a series ofchapters dedicated to particular issues, and a number of maps. It is indicated at theoutset of the plan that, in the event of a conflict, the written statement is to prevail overthe maps. See §1.1.4.3. as follows.“The 14 No. County Development Plan Maps provide a graphic representation of theproposals contained in the Written Statement and/or Appendices and indicate landuse zoning and control standards together with various other objectives of theCouncil. The Maps do not purport to be accurate survey maps from which sitedimensions or other survey data can be determined. Should any potential conflictsarise between the Written Statement and the County Maps the Written Statementshall prevail.”30. As flagged earlier, the principal dispute between the parties centres on whether theapplication site is subject to the “institutional lands” designation. The starting point forthe hypothetical “reasonably intelligent person”, in seeking to address this question,would be to consider the written statement of the development plan in order to identifythe policies and objectives applicable to institutional lands. The relevant policies andobjectives are set out in an appendix to this judgment. The intelligent reader would notethat it is the planning authority’s policy to retain the open character and/or recreationalamenity of these lands wherever possible.31. The intelligent reader would then turn to Map 1 of the 2016–2022 development planwhich sets out a graphic representation of zoning objectives and other objectivescontained in the written statement. The legend to Map 1 indicates that the symbol “INST”is employed to designate the objective “To protect and/or provide for Institutional Use inopen lands”. The language employed in the legend differs slightly from the writtenstatement which generally employs the term “institutional lands”. There is no definitionof “institution”, “institutional use” or “institutional lands” provided for under the 2016–2020 development plan. Examples of institutional use are cited at §2.1.3.5 as follows:education, residential or other such uses. A “residential institution” is defined under thedevelopment plan, for the purposes of the use classes, as “A building or part thereof orland used as a residential institution and includes a monastery, convent, hostel, home forolder persons/nursing home”.32. The dictionary definition of “institution” includes an organisation founded for inter aliareligious and education purposes.33. The “INST” symbol appears at a number of locations on Map 1. The size of the symbol isalways the same, i.e. the footprint of the symbol is not intended to delimit the landssubject to the designation.34. The application site is not separately identified in Map 1, but rather appears within alarger overall area of lands. These lands are shown as being surrounded on three sidesby existing housing, and on the fourth by a road. The site coverage of these lands, i.e.Page 9 ⇓the proportion of the lands occupied by buildings and structures, is noticeably less thanthe surrounding lands in residential use.35. There are a number of factors which indicate that the intelligent reader of thedevelopment plan would interpret it as applying the “institutional lands” designation tothe entire of the lands in the ownership of the religious congregation as of the date of theadoption of the 2016–2022 development plan (March 2016) as follows.36. First, the very description of the objective as per the legend to Map 1 emphasises theopen character of the lands so designated. The stated objective is to protect and/orprovide for institutional use in open lands. This is underscored by the relevant provisionsof the written statement of the development plan, in particular at §2.1.3.5 (Policy RES5:Institutional Lands) and §8.2.3.4 (xi) (Institutional Lands), which expressly refer to the“open character” of the lands. It is the stated policy of the planning authority to retainthe open character and/or recreational amenity of institutional lands wherever possible.It would be entirely inconsistent with these objectives to interpret Map 1 as confining thedesignation to the depicted buildings or structures within the immediate vicinity of the“INST” symbol. To do so would exclude the open lands, which are the very thing to whichthe development plan objectives and policies are directed.37. Secondly, it is evident from the features depicted on Map 1 that—as of March 2016 atleast—the lands to the south-west were still in institutional use. In particular, a hockeypitch associated with the secondary school (Jesus and Mary College) is depicted on themap, and straddles part of what is now the application site. This hockey pitch had anorth-south alignment, and approximately one-third of the pitch lay within the applicationsite. The secondary school has since obtained planning permission, on appeal, for theconstruction of a new synthetic all-weather hockey pitch. An Bord Pleanála’s decision togrant planning permission is dated 14 March 2019. In reaching its decision to grantplanning permission for the new pitch, An Bord Pleanála expressly relied on the“established use of the site for sports and recreation”. The new pitch has a differentalignment, i.e. east-west, than had the former hockey pitch, with the consequence thatthe full of the new pitch lies outside the application site.38. There had been some suggestion at the hearing before me that the former hockey pitchmay have fallen into disuse in more recent years, and that this is something of which theintelligent reader of the development plan would have knowledge. This suggestion wascontested by the objector, Mr Redmond. Neither side addressed this issue specifically intheir affidavit evidence. At all events, it is obvious from the approach taken by An BordPleanála in March 2019 to the application for a synthetic all-weather hockey pitch that theestablished use of the hockey pitch had not been abandoned. The established use forsports and recreation is expressly referenced by the board in its decision to grantplanning permission.39. An Bord Pleanála’s direction records that it had “decided to grant permission generally inaccordance with the Inspector’s recommendation”. The inspector had addressed theestablished use of the lands as follows at §7.1.2. of her report of 1 February 2019.Page 10 ⇓“The appeal site is within the grounds of an established Educational Institution, i.e.,Jesus and Mary College and the proposed use is an ancillary use to the existingsecondary school. Furthermore, the proposal would replace the existing hockeypitch. Therefore, I would consider that the proposed development represents areplacement of an existing use and having regard to the zoning objective of thearea I would consider that the proposed development would be acceptable inprinciple.”40. It follows that the intelligent reader examining the development plan in March 2016 wouldsimilarly understand that the lands occupied by the hockey pitch were associated with thesecondary school and remained in institutional use.41. Thirdly, the intelligent reader would be aware that—with the exception of the lands whichwere being transferred to the ownership of Durkan Estates Clonskeagh Ltd and have sincebeen developed as “The Grove”—the balance of the overall site remained in the ownershipof the religious congregation as of March 2016. As counsel for the developer correctlynoted, one of the factors which can be considered in identifying the relevant “planningunit” is the ownership or occupation of the lands. Counsel referenced the well-knownjudgment in Burdle v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1207(“Burdle”). This judgment suggests a three point test for identifying the relevant planningunit as follows.“First, whenever it is possible to recognise a single main purpose of the occupier’suse of his land to which secondary activities are incidental or ancillary, the wholeunit of occupation should be considered.[…]But, secondly, it may equally be apt to consider the entire unit of occupation eventhough the occupier carries on a variety of activities and it is not possible to saythat one is incidental or ancillary to another. This is well settled in the case of acomposite use where the component activities fluctuate in their intensity from timeto time, but the different activities are not confined within separate and physicallydistinct areas of land.Thirdly, however, it may frequently occur that within a single unit of occupation twoor more physically separate and distinct areas are occupied for substantiallydifferent and unrelated purposes. In such a case each area used for a differentmain purpose (together with its incidental and ancillary activities) ought to beconsidered as a separate planning unit.”42. The Court of Appeal, per Bridge J., then suggested the following “working rule”.“It may be a useful working rule to assume that the unit of occupation is the appropriateplanning unit, unless and until some smaller unit can be recognised as the site ofactivities which amount in substance to a separate use both physically and functionally.”Page 11 ⇓43. Counsel for the developer was careful to emphasise that Burdle is not a case concernedwith the interpretation of a development plan. Rather, it is a case concerningenforcement proceedings and established use rights. Counsel also submitted that thecrucial date for determining whether lands are in institutional use must be the date of therelevant application for planning permission. I will return to examine these submissionsin more detail under the next heading, at paragraph 48 below.44. For present purposes, I am satisfied that the intelligent reader of the 2016–2022development plan would attach weight to the ownership of the lands in identifying theextent of the “institutional lands” designation. As of the date of the adoption of thedevelopment plan, what is now the application site had been part of the overall lands inthe ownership of the religious congregation. These lands were being used for religiousand educational uses associated with the congregation.45. Finally, it is necessary to address the principal argument relied upon by An Bord Pleanálaand the developer, which is to the effect that the precise location of the “INST” symbolwithin the overall landholding would be regarded as significant by the intelligent reader.More specifically, it was submitted that the location of the symbol in the north-east cornerof the overall landholding would be understood as drawing a clear demarcation betweenthe northern uses and the southern uses. The “INST” symbol was described as beingtucked on the north-eastern corner of the site where all of the school-related uses andbuildings are said to be. The south-western part of the site was described as beingunused at the time, and as not available for public access or recreation. The location ofthe “INST” symbol was said to reflect the rationalisation of the institutional uses to thenorth of the overall landholding.46. With respect, there are a number of flaws in this argument, and I have concluded that itdoes not represent the correct interpretation of the development plan for the followingreasons. (To avoid unnecessary duplication with the discussion above, the reasons arestated in short form where there is an overlap with the earlier discussion. The reasonswhich follow should be read in conjunction with that earlier discussion.)(1). The contended for division of the overall landholding between institutional uses tothe north-east and non-institutional uses to the south-west ignores the fact that theformer hockey pitch continued to have an established institutional use, i.e. it hadan established use for sports which was ancillary to the secondary school. Thisestablished use had been expressly recognised by An Bord Pleanála as recently asMarch 2019 in its decision in respect of the new all-weather hockey pitch.(2). The “open lands” to the south-west remained in the ownership of the religiouscongregation as of March 2016. The written statement of the development planexpressly refers to the “open character” of the lands. It would be illogical toexclude open lands, which are the very thing to which the objectives and policiesare directed, from the designation.Page 12 ⇓(3). There are “INST” symbols dotted throughout Map 1. It would be immediatelyapparent to the intelligent reader of the development plan that the precise locationof these “INST” symbols, relative to the particular open lands and structures towhich each individual symbol refers, does not follow any coherent pattern. Thereare, for example, three “INST” symbols on lands to the north of the religiouscongregation’s landholding. In the case of “Saint Killian’s Deutsche Schule”, thesymbol appears to have been placed in the vicinity of a playing field depicted onMap 1, rather than placed on any of the depicted school buildings. For the lands tothe right of the German School, the symbol appears in the middle of the buildings,but for the lands on the right, the symbol is away from the buildings. In the caseof the religious congregation’s own landholding, the symbol appears to be placed ontop of the depiction of the primary school (and not on both the primary andsecondary school). It can scarcely be suggested that the designation was confinedto the primary school.Given the manner in which the placement of the “INST” symbol varies throughoutthe map, the intelligent reader would assume that the precise location of thesymbol within an overall landholding was not intended to be determinative.(4). The “INST” symbols are all of uniform size, and it appears from the scale on Map 1that the symbol would only cover a footprint of roughly 50 m x 25 m. It is obvious,therefore, that the designation cannot be confined to the lands immediately withinthe footprint of the symbol.47. In summary, therefore, I have concluded that the application site (which it will be recalledhad accommodated part of the secondary school’s hockey pitch) was subject to the“institutional lands” designation as of the date of the adoption of the development plan inMarch 2016. It is next necessary to consider whether the subsequent sale of theapplication site altered the planning status of the site.SALE OF THE APPLICATION SITE48. As flagged under the previous heading, counsel for the developer placed much emphasison the transfer of ownership of the application site from the religious congregation to thedeveloper in 2017. The developer purchased some 2.34 hectares from the congregation.Counsel for the developer confirmed that the sale was completed in October 2017 (Day 3transcript, page 4).49. The lands in sale included approximately one third of the north-south hockey pitch; andlands which had been occupied by the former primary school and the former conventbuilding. The former primary school buildings were demolished after the new primaryschool had been completed in August 2012. The new primary school is located to thenorth-east. Planning permission for a new all-weather hockey pitch had been granted inMarch 2019, and the new pitch is now located on the north-west part of the overalllandholding.Page 13 ⇓50. It is argued on behalf of the developer that the legal effect of this transfer of ownership inOctober 2017 is that the lands in sale were no longer available to the institutional use.51. The gravamen of the argument is that the extent of lands subject to the “institutionallands” designation should be determined by reference to the use of the lands as of thedate that an application for planning permission for residential development is lodged,and not the use of the lands as of the date the 2016–2022 development plan was adopted(March 2016). The developer lodged the planning application, which culminated in theplanning permission impugned in these proceedings, on 10 May 2019. As of that date,the application site was already in the ownership of the developer. The legal consequenceof this, it is said, is that the application site was no longer available to the institutionaluse, and the designation no longer applied. It was further submitted that whereas theinterpretation of the development plan does not change, the practical extent of the“institutional lands” designation on the ground did change as a result of the transfer ofownership. (Day 3 transcript, page 20).52. Before turning to examine the developer’s argument in detail, it should be noted that theposition adopted by An Bord Pleanála was more nuanced. The board’s position before theHigh Court concentrated on what was said to have been the rationalisation of theinstitutional uses on the north-eastern part of the overall landholding, rather than on thechange in ownership of the lands. The implication was that certain parcels of land hadceased to be put to institutional use, and it was for this reason that the designation nolonger applied. Reference was made, in particular, to the relocation of the primary schoolto the north-eastern part of the overall landholding, and the (alleged) disuse of thehockey pitch. Counsel explained that An Bord Pleanála was not saying that one candefeat a development plan by simply changing the ownership of lands. For example, itwas not being suggested that if the religious congregation had sold off the primary schoolbuilding that it would then cease to be in institutional use. (Day 2 transcript, pages 50 to53).53. Returning to the developer’s argument, I have concluded that the sale of the lands did nothave the radical effect in planning terms contended for by the developer. The rationalefor this conclusion is as follows.54. The relevant policies and objectives of the development plan are intended to inform thedetermination of planning applications which seek permission to authorise a materialchange in the use of lands which have an established use as “institutional lands”. Thedevelopment plan seeks to balance the objective of maintaining lands in institutional use,against the practical reality that, in some instances, there may no longer be a demand forinstitutional use. It is expressly stated that where no demand for an alternativeinstitutional use is evident or foreseen, the planning authority may permit alternativeuses subject to the zoning objectives of the area and the open character of the landsbeing retained. On the facts of the present case, the relevant zoning objectives wouldallow for residential development.Page 14 ⇓55. On the developer’s argument, the elaborate provision made under the development planfor regulating a change from an established institutional use to residential use would beset at naught. The development plan objectives could be by-passed by the simpleexpedient of a transfer of ownership. Lands which were subject to institutional use at thetime the development plan was made, and for which planning permission could only beobtained by reference to the relevant development plan objectives, would be releasedfrom these requirements by the stroke of a pen on a contract for sale. On thisinterpretation, the only effect of the development plan would be to regulate thedevelopment of the lands for so long as they remained in the ownership of the religiouscongregation. The restriction would be peculiar to the congregation and would not serveany wider planning purpose.56. With respect, such an interpretation would make an absurdity of the development plan.Development objectives are not intended to be personal or peculiar to individuallandowners. Rather, planning permission enures for the benefit of the land. Thedeveloper’s argument ignores the fact that, as of the date of the adoption of thedevelopment plan, the lands had an established institutional use. This established useand designation is not lost by dint of a transfer of ownership. Rather, it remains untilsuch time as planning permission is granted for an alternative use, such as, for example,residential use. The relevant development plan policies are precisely intended to regulatethe circumstances in which such a change in use might be authorised. It is illogical to saythat those policies did not bite on the planning application in the present case, anapplication which sought planning permission to do the very thing which the developmentobjectives are designed to regulate, i.e. to change the authorised use from institutionaluse to residential use.57. Put otherwise, the development plan contains policies which govern the release ofinstitutional lands for residential development. Yet on the developer’s argument, thesepolicies simply do not apply to it. For the reasons set out above, this is an incorrectinterpretation of the development plan.58. Finally, it should be reiterated that the fact that the application site is subject to the“institutional lands” designation does not preclude the grant of planning permission forresidential development, for the following reasons. First, even on their own terms, thedevelopment plan policies and objectives envisage that residential use may be permittedin certain circumstances. Secondly, An Bord Pleanála is authorised to grant planningpermission in material contravention of the development plan. Thirdly, the provisions ofthe development plan can be overridden by Ministerial guidelines issued under section 28of the PDA 2000 (as amended). The Minister can include “specific planning policyrequirements” in guidelines. Where such specific planning policy requirements differ fromthe provisions of the development plan, then those requirements shall, to the extent thatthey so differ, apply instead of the provisions of the development plan. (See section 9(3)of the PD(H)A 2016). (No reliance has been placed on any specific planning policyrequirements to justify a material contravention of the development plan on the facts ofthe present case).Page 15 ⇓59. It also remains open to the new owners of the application site, i.e. the developer, to applyto have the status of the lands changed as part of the next development plan cycle.MATERIAL CONTRAVENTION OF ZONING OBJECTIVE?60. For the reasons set out above, I have concluded that the application site is subject to thedevelopment plan policies and objectives applicable to institutional lands. The nextquestion to be considered is whether the decision to grant planning permission involved amaterial contravention of a zoning objective of the development plan.61. The significance of the distinction between zoning objectives and non-zoning objectives isthat An Bord Pleanála is precluded from granting planning permission for strategichousing development under the PD(H)A 2016 if the proposed development wouldconstitute a material contravention of the development plan or local area plan in relationto the zoning of the land (section 9(6)(b)).62. Map 1 of the 2016–2022 development plan indicates that the application site is subject tothe zoning objective “Objective A To protect and or improve residential amenity”.63. There was some debate at the hearing before me as to whether the label which adevelopment plan attaches to a particular objective is conclusive on the question ofwhether the objective is a zoning objective or not. Put shortly, does the fact that thedevelopment plan describes a particular policy as a “zoning objective” make it such.Counsel for the developer suggested that what a development plan labels as a “zoningobjective” may, in truth, entail a combination of zoning and non-zoning objectives.Counsel cited, by way of example, a development plan which purported to zone an areafor “low density residential development”, and suggested that the policy in respect ofdensity does not form part of a zoning objective within the meaning of section 10 of thePDA 2000.64. For the reasons which follow, I have determined that whereas the label “zoning objective”as employed under a development plan will usually coincide with the legal concept of azoning objective, the label cannot be conclusive. The concept of a zoning objective is aterm of art under the planning legislation. The concept is introduced under section10(2)(a) of the PDA 2000 as follows.“(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a development plan shallinclude objectives for—(a) the zoning of land for the use solely or primarily of particular areas forparticular purposes (whether residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural,recreational, as open space or otherwise, or a mixture of those uses), whereand to such extent as the proper planning and sustainable development ofthe area, in the opinion of the planning authority, requires the uses to beindicated;”65. A zoning objective enjoys an enhanced status over that of other policies and objectivesunder a development plan. This is most immediately apparent from the provisions ofPage 16 ⇓section 9(6)(b) of the PD(H)A 2016 discussed above. A zoning objective also has aparticular significance in the context of statutory compensation under Part XII of the PDA2000. The general position under Part XII is that a decision to refuse planning permissionwill attract the payment of statutory compensation if that decision has the effect ofreducing the value of an interest in the affected lands. This entitlement to compensationis, however, subject to a large number of exceptions. Relevantly, compensation will notbe payable where planning permission has been refused for the following reason.(Schedule 5 of the PDA 2000, paragraph 20).“20. The development would contravene materially a development objective indicated inthe development plan for the zoning of land for the use solely or primarily ofparticular areas for particular purposes (whether residential, commercial, industrial,agricultural, recreational, as open space or otherwise or a mixture of such uses).”66. (This is subject to certain safeguards which address the contingency of a change in zoningobjective having been made during the currency of the development plan).67. The question of whether a particular development represents a material contravention ofa zoning objective thus has a special importance both to landowners and to the localplanning authority (as the entity liable to pay statutory compensation). It would beunsatisfactory were the label that the planning authority attached to an objective in thedevelopment plan to be conclusive of whether the objective was a zoning objective. Putotherwise, the fact that a development plan mistakenly describes a particular policy as a“zoning objective” cannot defeat a claim for compensation. It is clear from the case lawthat the courts will consider the substance of the relevant development plan policy orobjective in order to determine whether or not it operates to exclude compensation. See,for example, Ebonwood Ltd v. Meath County Council [2004] 3 I.R. 34.68. Returning to the facts of the present case, the position is clear-cut. The zoning objectiveapplicable to the lands is “Objective A To protect and/or improve residential amenity”.The institutional lands designation does not amount to a zoning objective. First, thedesignation does not purport to override the residential zoning objective. Rather, thepolicies and objectives triggered by the designation expressly recognise that residentialdevelopment may in principle be permissible, but seek to regulate the precisecircumstances in which residential development might be authorised and the conditions,for example, in respect of open space, which might be attached to a grant.69. Secondly, the limited extent of the lands subject to the designation suggests that thedesignation is more akin to the reservation of land for a particular purpose, i.e. a form ofspot zoning, than to a general zoning objective. (cf. Monastra Developments Ltd v.Dublin County Council [1992] 1 I.R. 468).70. Finally, it is necessary to address an argument made by the objector by reference to thetreatment of institutional lands under the development plan of a different planningauthority, namely Dublin City Council. The original version of the Dublin CityDevelopment Plan 2011–2017 had purported to regulate the development of institutionalPage 17 ⇓lands by way of a zoning objective, namely “Z15 (To protect and provide for institutionaland community uses)”. A challenge to the validity of this zoning objective was taken onbehalf of the Sisters of Charity. The challenge was ultimately resolved on the narrowgrounds that adequate reasons for the impugned objective had not been stated. SeeChristian v. Dublin City Council (No. 1) [2012] IEHC 163; [2012] 2 I.R. 506. The matterwas remitted to the planning authority for reconsideration in the light of the findings ofthe High Court, and a different form of objective was ultimately adopted.71. Mr Redmond seeks to rely on the fact that Dublin City Council had sought to implementits policies by way of a zoning objective in support of his argument that the policies andobjectives under the Dun Laoghaire Rathdown development plan 2016–2022 should becharacterised as a zoning objective. With respect, no useful analogy can be drawnbetween the two development plans. The nature of the policies and objectives areentirely different. Crucially, under the impugned version of the Dublin City Councildevelopment plan, the relevant objective had excluded residential development as a usewhich was either permissible or open for consideration. By contrast, on the facts of thepresent case, the application site is subject to a residential zoning, and there is noinconsistency between that zoning objective and the additional policies and objectiveswhich apply to institutional lands. The policies and objectives recognise that institutionallands can be developed for residential use, but seek to regulate how and when this isdone.72. In summary, a decision to grant planning permission for residential development on landssubject to the “institutional lands” designation would not involve a material contraventionof a zoning objective under the 2016–2022 development plan. Consequently, theimpugned decision to grant planning permission does not fall foul of the prohibition undersection 9(6)(b) of the PD(H)A 2016.MATERIAL CONTRAVENTION OF NON-ZONING OBJECTIVE?73. The consequence of the finding that the application site is subject to the institutionallands designation is that the planning application was subject to certain policies andobjectives under the 2016–2022 development plan, as set out at §2.1.3.5; §8.2.3.4 (xi)and §8.2.8.2 (i). These sections of the development plan have been reproduced in full inan appendix to this judgment.74. The test for determining whether a contravention is material is that prescribed by theHigh Court (Barron J.) in Roughan v. Clare County Council, unreported, High Court,Barron J., 18 December 1996.“It has been submitted on behalf of the Applicants that what is or is not a materialdevelopment has to be considered in the light of the substance of the proposeddevelopment; whether or not any change of use would be significant; the locationof the proposed development; the planning history of the site or area; and theobjectives of the development plan. I accept that all these matters must be takeninto account when considering whether or not any proposed contravention of thedevelopment plan is material. What is material depends upon the grounds uponPage 18 ⇓which the proposed development is being, or might reasonably be expected to be,opposed by local interests. If there are no real or substantial grounds in thecontext of planning law for opposing the development, then it is unlikely to be amaterial contravention.”75. This test has been very recently approved of by the High Court (Baker J.) in Byrnes v.Dublin City Council [2017] IEHC 19, [23].76. For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that the proposed development representsa material contravention of the development plan policies and objectives in respect ofhousing density and minimum open space. It is sufficient for the disposition of thesejudicial review proceedings to find that these two policies and objectives have beenbreached. These are fundamental provisions of the development plan, and the extent ofthe contravention of same is “material” having regard to the principles set out in Roughan(above).77. The position in respect of other of the policies and objectives of the development plan ismore nuanced in that the application of same entails the exercise of subjective planningexpertise.(i). Housing Density78. The proposed development involves a material contravention of the relevant developmentplan policy in respect of housing density. Policy RES 5, which is set out at §2.1.3.5 of thedevelopment plan, addresses the housing density applicable to institutional lands asfollows.“In the development of such lands, average net densities should be in the region of35 – 50 units p/ha. In certain instances higher densities will be allowed where it isdemonstrated that they can contribute towards the objective of retaining the opencharacter and/or recreational amenities of the lands.”79. The proposed development has a housing density of approx. 67 units per hectare. Thisdensity is well in excess of 35 – 50 units per hectare. It is, of course, the case that PolicyRES 5 allows for higher densities in certain circumstances, i.e. where it is demonstratedthat the higher densities can contribute towards the objective of retaining the opencharacter and/or recreational amenities of the institutional lands. This reflects therationale underlying the 2009 Ministerial Guidelines on Sustainable ResidentialDevelopment in Urban Areas (cited by the objector), wherein it is indicated at §5.10 thatthe objective of retaining the open character of institutional lands might be achieved byconcentrating increased densities in selected parts of the overall lands. A figure of 70units per hectare is instanced in the guidelines.80. There is no suggestion in the present case that An Bord Pleanála’s decision to authorise adensity of c.67 units per hectare had been informed by the objective of retaining the opencharacter and/or recreational amenities of the lands. Rather, the approach taken by thePage 19 ⇓inspector, and adopted by the board, had been to treat the application site as beingsubject to a different policy, namely, Policy RES 3, which provides that, as a general rule,the minimum default density for new residential developments shall be 35 units perhectare. A higher minimum density of 50 units per hectare will be encouraged where aproposed development is located within circa 1 kilometre pedestrian catchment of a railstation, Luas line, BRT, Priority 1 Quality Bus Corridor and/or 500 metres of a Bus PriorityRoute. The inspector accepted that none of those criteria were fulfilled by the applicationsite. The inspector addressed RES 3 as follows at §12.2.4 and §12.2.5 of her report.“Policy RES 3 of the County Development Plan 2016-2022 requires a minimumdefault density of 35 units per hectare for new residential development in areasoutside of e.g. a 1km pedestrian catchment of a Luas line, 1km from a Town orDistrict Centre etc. Densities of 50 units per hectare are required within thesecatchments. The subject site is around a 1.4km walk to the nearest Luas stop andtown/district centre. As such, the required minimum default density of 35 units perhectares applies.Density at 67 units per hectare (132 no. units on a 1.969 hectare site) isconsidered appropriate for this location and in compliance with relevant section 28ministerial guidelines. The proposal to increase the density is consideredappropriate given the location of the site and the proposal is not considered torepresent overdevelopment of the site. The 3 no. proposed five-storey apartmentblocks have 109 no. apartments in total. Block A, the south western block, has 38no. units; Block B the south eastern unit, has 38 no. units and Block C, the northwestern block, has 33 no. units. There are 4 no. apartment units in Block Dcomprising two ground floor apartments with 2 no. duplex apartments above. Unitmix is good with 18 no. 1-bed units, 83 no. 2-bed units and 12 no. 3-bed unitsproposed. This would lead to a good population mix within the scheme, catering topersons at various stages of the lifecycle, in accordance with Specific PlanningPolicy Requirements (SPPRs) in the Sustainable Urban Housing: Design Standardsfor New Apartments’ Guidelines 2018. The proposal for higher density at thislocation accords with Ministerial Guidelines.The Urban Development and Building Heights Guidelines for Planning Authorities(2018) relate to building heights for apartment buildings. Reusing brownfield landand building up urban infill sites is required to meet the needs of a growingpopulation without growing urban areas outwards and ‘increased building height isa significant component in making optimal use of the capacity of sites in urbanareas…’ Section 3.1 states that ‘it is Government policy that building heights mustbe generally increased in appropriate urban locations. There is therefore apresumption in favour of increased heights in … urban locations with good publictransport accessibility’. The site is proximate to public transport, with bus routeson Goatstown Road and the NTA report is supportive of the proposeddevelopment.”Page 20 ⇓81. As appears, the justification for the higher density of 67 units per hectare seems to havebeen informed by factors such as that the site was proximate to the bus routes on theGoatstown Road. (These are not Priority 1 Quality Bus Corridors). It also seems that theinspector had accepted the submission made by the developer that the application siteshould be characterised as an “intermediate urban location” under the statutoryguidelines, Sustainable Urban Development: Design Standards for New Apartment (March2018). It should be noted that whereas those guidelines do contain certain “specificplanning policy requirements” or “SPPRs”, same do not relate to housing density.82. In summary, therefore, the board erred in finding that the proposed development wassubject to the housing density set out at RES 3. Rather, the housing density to be appliedwas that provided for under RES 5. The planning permission purports to authorise adensity of c.67 units per hectare. This density exceeds that generally provided for underRES 5, i.e. 35 units per hectare, and does not meet the criteria for higher density underRES 5 because the permitted density does not contribute towards the objective ofretaining the open character and/or recreational amenities of the institutional lands.83. Counsel for An Bord Pleanála made the point at the hearing before me that the argumentin relation to RES 5 was one advanced by the objector alone. More specifically, theplanning authority had not recommended the refusal of planning permission on the basisthat the density breached RES 5.84. This submission is correct insofar as it goes. However, in circumstances where theinterpretation of a development plan, and, in particular, the determination of whether ornot a proposed development would involve a material contravention of the developmentplan, is a question of law for the court, then the views of neither the planning authoritynor An Bord Pleanála can be decisive. Put otherwise, the fact that the planning authoritydoes not appear to have appreciated that the development would involve a materialcontravention of RES 5 does not preclude the court from reaching a contrary view in thesejudicial review proceedings. The argument that the proposed development involved abreach of RES 5 had been expressly raised by the objector in his submission to An BordPleanála, and, again, at the hearing before me. For the reasons set out above, I amsatisfied that the objector’s argument is well founded, and that there is, indeed, amaterial contravention of RES 5.(ii). Minimum open space provision85. The proposed development also involves a material contravention of the relevantdevelopment plan policy in respect of open space provision. The development planrequires a minimum open space provision of 25% of either (i) the total site area, or (ii) apopulation based provision, whichever is the greater. This open space provision must besufficient to maintain the open character of the site.86. The relevant parts of the policy, as set out at §8.2.3.4 (xi), read as follows.Page 21 ⇓“There are still a number of large institutions in the established suburbs of theCounty which may be subject to redevelopment pressures in the coming years.The principal aims of any eventual redevelopment of these lands will be to achievea sustainable amount of development while ensuring the essential setting of thelands and the integrity of the main buildings are retained. In order to promote ahigh standard of development a comprehensive masterplan should accompany aplanning application for institutional sites.* Such a masterplan must adequatelytake account of the built heritage and natural assets of a site and establishedrecreational use patterns. Public access to all or some of the lands may berequired. Every planning application lodged on institutional lands shall clearlydemonstrate how they conform with the agreed masterplan for the overall site.*Should any proposed development deviate from the agreed masterplan then arevised masterplan shall be agreed with the Planning Authority.A minimum open space provision of 25% of the total site area* (or a populationbased provision in accordance with Section 8.2.8.2 whichever is the greater) will berequired on Institutional Lands. This provision must be sufficient to maintain theopen character of the site – with development proposals built around existingfeatures and layout, particularly by reference to retention of trees, boundary wallsand other features as considered necessary by the Council.”*Emphasis (italics) added.87. An Bord Pleanála and the developer contend that the proposed development achieves thisopen space provision. (The figure is calculated by reference to the populationequivalent). This contention is, however, predicated on interpreting the phrase “the totalsite area” as referring only to the application site, i.e. the lands within the red line of theplanning application, and as not referring to the overall institutional lands. With respect,this interpretation is incorrect. The precise purpose of the objective under §8.2.3.4 (xi) isto ensure that the open character of the institutional lands is maintained. This purposewould be defeated if the minimum open space requirement were to be confined to thepart of the institutional lands to be developed.88. The position is correctly stated by the planning authority at page 17 of the chiefexecutive’s report as follows.“The second requirement for ‘INST’ sites is that 25% of the site area or apopulation-based equivalent, whichever is higher, of public open space be provided‘sufficient to maintain the open character of the site’. The applicant asserts that28.9% of the ‘red line’ site is provided as public open space. However, it is theplanning authority’s assertion that this 25% requirement should apply to theentirety of the campus, rather than in a piecemeal fashion. The intention of thepolicy is clearly to retain the ‘open character’ of the site, and this can only be doneby way of a comprehensive approach. Heretofore, the planning permissions on sitehave developed the campus to a relatively high intensity, while the western andsouth-western portions of the campus have remained effectively greenfield,Page 22 ⇓preserving the open nature of the campus, and maintaining the aggregate openspace at above 25%. It is only the subject application that has the potential todrop the open space across the campus to below the 25% mark. As such, it is atthis point that the matter must be given serious consideration.There has been no assessment of the public open space provision across thecampus provided by the applicant, but it is evident from a cursory consideration ofthe proposed layout that a level of 25% would not be achieved. As such, theplanning authority considers that the proposed development is contrary to thepolicies of the CDP, and should be refused on this basis.”89. The second of the three reasons for refusal recommended by the planning authority readsas follows.“The proposed development, by virtue of reducing the provided and potential publicopen space across Our Lady’s Grove campus to a level below 25%, and by virtue ofthe removal of the vast majority of trees from within the subject-site, would becontrary to Section 8.2.3.4 (xi) of the Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown-CountyDevelopment Plan 2016–2022.”90. In circumstances where I have concluded that there has been a material contravention ofthe 25% open space requirement, it is unnecessary to go further and consider whetherthere is an additional material contravention by virtue of the removal of trees. The firstfinding on its own has the consequence that the planning permission is invalid.91. Finally, for the sake of completeness, it is open to the court to make a finding of materialcontravention notwithstanding that the planning authority itself merely refers to theproposed development being “contrary” to §8.2.3.4 (xi). The question of whether or notthere is a material contravention is, ultimately, a question of law for the court.(iii). Future provision of additional educational facilities92. A further consequence of An Bord Pleanála’s error in failing to recognise that theapplication site was subject to the “institutional lands” designation is that the board didnot properly take into account the possible need for the provision of additional schoolfacilities. This was a matter which required to be taken into account under RES 5. See§2.1.3.5 of the development plan as follows.“In cases of rationalisation of an existing institutional use, as opposed to thecomplete cessation of that use, the possible need for the future provision ofadditional facilities related to the residual retained institutional use retained on sitemay require to be taken into account. (This particularly applies to schools where aportion of the site has been disposed of but a school use remains on the residualpart of the site.)”93. There is nothing on the face of An Bord Pleanála’s decision to indicate that it took thismatter into account. Indeed, there is no reference at all to the existing schools in thePage 23 ⇓board’s formal decision. For the reasons discussed at paragraph 124 et seq. below, theboard is not entitled to call in aid the inspector’s report in this regard.MISINTERPRETATION IS AN ERROR OF LAW94. The misinterpretation of the development plan is an error of law which goes tojurisdiction. An Bord Pleanála is under an express statutory obligation to have regard tothe development plan in determining an application for planning permission under thePD(H)A 2016 (see section 9(2)(a)). It is a necessary corollary of this obligation that theboard must correctly interpret the development plan. A decision-maker cannot be said tohave properly had regard to objectives or policies which it has misunderstood.CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S REPORT95. It is alleged that An Bord Pleanála failed to consider the recommendations made in thestatutory report from the planning authority, and that this represents a breach of therequirements of section 9(1)(a) of the PD(H)A 2016. To put this allegation in context, itis necessary to rehearse the relevant legislative provisions in respect of the planningauthority’s report.96. Section 8 of the PD(H)A 2016 requires the chief executive of a planning authority, inwhose area a proposed strategic housing development would be situated, to prepare areport (“the chief executive’s report”). The report must set out, inter alia, the chiefexecutive’s views on the effects of the proposed development on the proper planning andsustainable development of the area of the planning authority and on the environment.97. There are a number of specific matters which must be addressed in the chief executive’sreport as follows (section 8(5)(b)).“(b) In the report referred to in paragraph (a) the planning authority shall—(i) set out the authority’s opinion as to whether the proposed strategic housingdevelopment would be consistent with the relevant objectives of thedevelopment plan or local area plan, as the case may be,(ii) include a statement as to whether the authority recommends to the Boardthat permission should be granted or refused, together with the reasons forits recommendation, and(iii) specify in the report—(I) where the authority recommends that permission be granted, theplanning conditions (if any), and the reasons and grounds for them,that it would recommend in the event that the Board decides to grantpermission, or(II) if appropriate in the circumstances, where the authority recommendsthat permission be refused, the planning conditions, and the reasonsand grounds for them, that it would recommend in the event that theBoard decides to grant permission.”98. As appears, the planning authority is obliged to state whether it recommends thatpermission should be granted or refused, together with the reasons for itsPage 24 ⇓recommendation. In circumstances where the planning authority recommends thatpermission be refused, the authority may nevertheless go on to specify the planningconditions that it would recommend in the event that the board decides to grantpermission. Where the planning authority does specify conditions, then it must alsospecify the reasons and grounds for those conditions.99. On the facts of the present case, the chief executive’s report had recommended thatplanning permission be refused on three grounds. (These are set out in an appendix tothis judgment). The report then specifies some twenty-five planning conditions that theplanning authority would recommend in the event that the board decided to grantpermission. The third of these conditions assumes a particular significance given themanner in which the application was addressed by the inspector. The recommendedcondition reads as follows.“3. The area in the northeast of the campus identified as ‘Option Site’ shall be used foreducation purposes only. The area of public open space within the subject site shallbe made available for use by all users of the wider Our Lady’s Grove campus,including the schools.Reason: in the interests of providing for the existing and future needs of theeducational uses on the campus.”100. This condition had been replicated by the inspector in her report, but subsequentlyomitted by An Bord Pleanála from its decision. I will return to consider this condition atparagraph 124 below.101. The objector’s complaint is that the recommendations in the chief executive’s report werenot considered in any meaningful way by An Bord Pleanála.102. In practical terms, the only basis on which a member of the public, the planning authorityand, ultimately, the court, can assess whether An Bord Pleanála did properly consider thechief executive’s report is by reference to the reasons and considerations stated for theboard’s decision. Whereas An Bord Pleanála is not, of course, in any sense bound by therecommendations in the chief executive’s report, it should be evident that the board hasconsidered the recommendations. Were it otherwise, the High Court would be unable toexercise its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure compliance with section 9(1)(a)(i) of thePD(H)A 2016.103. On the facts of the present case, there is no express reference in the formal decision ofAn Bord Pleanála to the chief executive’s report at all. It is, however, clear from theinspector’s report that same was considered by her, and, in particular, reference is madein the inspector’s report both to the recommended reasons for refusal, and to therecommended conditions as per the chief executive’s report.104. There are, in effect, two strands to the objector’s arguments in respect of this ground ofchallenge. First, it is submitted that An Bord Pleanála should have addressed the chiefPage 25 ⇓executive’s report in its formal decision. Secondly, it is submitted that even if the boardis to be taken as having adopted the inspector’s report, that report does not engage inany meaningful way with the chief executive’s recommendations. I address each of thesearguments in turn under separate headings below.(i). An Bord Pleanála and the inspector’s report105. The first issue to be addressed is whether the analysis in the inspector’s report can beimputed to An Bord Pleanála. This issue falls to be resolved by reference to the legalprinciples set out by the Supreme Court in Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31;[2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453 (“Connelly”). The Supreme Court indicated that, in principle, thereasons for a decision may be derived in a variety of ways, either from a range ofdocuments or from the context of the decision, or in some other fashion. This is subjectalways to the requirement that the reasons must actually be ascertainable and capable ofbeing determined. In the specific context of planning decisions, the Supreme Courtaccepted that in assessing the adequacy of reasons, it was appropriate to have regard notonly to An Bord Pleanála’s formal decision, but also to the report prepared in respect ofthe planning appeal by an inspector employed by An Bord Pleanála. The inspector’sreport is made available to the public at the same time as the board’s decision is notified.The Supreme Court further accepted that it might also be appropriate to have regard tothe documentation accompanying the planning appeal, including documentationsubmitted by the applicant for planning permission, i.e. the proposed developer.106. The Supreme Court indicated that it would be preferable in all cases if An Bord Pleanálamade expressly clear whether it accepts all of the findings of its inspector or, if not sodoing, where and in what respect it differs. Failure to do so is not, however, necessarilyfatal if in the circumstances it is possible to reach a significantly clear inference as to whatthe board thought in that regard.107. Where the board differs from its inspector, then there is clearly an obligation for theboard to set out the reasons for coming to that conclusion in sufficient detail to enable aperson to know why the board differed from the inspector, and also to assess whetherthere was any basis for suggesting that the board’s decision is thereby not sustainable.108. I turn now to apply these principles to the facts of the present case. The board’s formaldecision does not expressly adopt the inspector’s report, nor does it expressly accept thereport’s findings. As stated by Clarke C.J. in Connelly, it would be preferable in all casesif the board made expressly clear whether it accepts all of the findings of an inspector.109. The board direction, which is the precursor to the board’s formal decision and is publishedon the board’s website, does record that the board “decided to grant permission generallyin accordance with the Inspector’s recommendation”. The content of the board’s formaldecision is broadly similar to that of the inspector’s recommended form of decision. Onedistinction between the two documents is that the formal decision omits any expressfinding to the effect that the proposed development is consistent with the developmentplan. The inspector’s recommended form of decision had expressly stated that thePage 26 ⇓nature, scale and design of the proposed development is consistent with the provisions ofthe 2016–2022 development plan.110. A second distinction is that the board’s formal decision also omits a condition stipulatingthat an area in the north-east of the overall landholding was to be used for educationpurposes only. The text of this recommended condition is set out at paragraph 124below.111. It seems reasonable to infer that—with the exception of the treatment of the futureexpansion of the existing school sites—the board accepted the findings in the inspector’sreport. In particular, I am satisfied that the board agreed with the inspector’s (mistaken)finding at §12.1.8 of her report that the application site is not subject to the institutionallands designation. (This finding appears to have been predicated on (i) the location of the“INST” symbol to the north-east of the lands, and (ii) the fact that the application site isnow in private ownership).112. It is correct to say, as the objector does, that An Bord Pleanála’s formal decision does notcontain an express finding to the effect that the lands were not subject to the“institutional lands” designation. It would have been preferable if the formal decision hadset out an express finding on this issue, and on the related issue of the appropriatehousing density. It is also, perhaps, unfortunate that the inspector’s discussion at§12.1.9 segues from a finding that there is no material contravention to a suggestion thata material contravention would be justified in any event. It would have been preferable ifthere had been an unequivocal statement by the inspector that she was finding that theapplication site was not subject to the “institutional lands” designation, and that hersubsequent observations, i.e. that a material contravention would be justified, were madein the alternative only.(ii). Does inspector’s report contain a proper consideration of chief executive’s report113. Having ruled that the inspector’s findings can be imputed to An Bord Pleanála—with theexception of her findings on the issue of the future expansion of the existing schools—it isnext necessary to consider whether the inspector’s report demonstrates that the chiefexecutive’s report has been properly considered as required under section 9(1)(a) of thePD(H)A 2016.114. Counsel on behalf of An Bord Pleanála and the developer both made much of the fact thatthere is no express requirement under the PD(H)A 2016 to state the reasons for notfollowing the recommendations in the chief executive’s report. This was contrasted withthe requirement, in the case of a conventional planning application, to state reasons fornot accepting the recommendation of the board’s inspector. See section 34(10)(b) of thePDA 2000 as follows.“(b) Where a decision by a planning authority under this section or by the Board undersection 37 to grant or to refuse permission is different, in relation to the granting orrefusal of permission, from the recommendation in—Page 27 ⇓(i) the reports on a planning application to the chief executive (or such otherperson delegated to make the decision) in the case of a planning authority, or(ii) a report of a person assigned to report on an appeal on behalf of the Board,a statement under paragraph (a) shall indicate the main reasons for not acceptingthe recommendation in the report or reports to grant or refuse permission.”115. This submission is correct insofar as it goes. It would, however, be a mistake to read toomuch into the absence of an express provision requiring An Bord Pleanála to indicate themain reasons for not accepting the recommendations in the chief executive’s report.First, there is an important distinction between the respective reports of the board’sinspector and the chief executive. The former is an internal report which is prepared byan employee or agent of An Bord Pleanála. The latter is prepared by a separatecompetent authority, namely the local planning authority. The report contains not onlythe views of the chief executive, but also those of the “relevant elected members” asdefined. Article 28A of the Constitution of Ireland expressly recognises the role of localgovernment in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities,in exercising and performing at local level powers and functions conferred by law and inpromoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities. See, generally, Christian v.Dublin City Council (No. 1) [2012] IEHC 163; [2012] 2 I.R. 506, [17].“It seems to me that the provisions of Article 28A of the Constitution, and the moredetailed measures cited from the Local Government Act 2001, provide aconstitutional and legal acknowledgement of the importance of the role of localrepresentative democracy in our constitutional model. It remains, of course, thecase that local authorities have no inherent jurisdiction. The power of localgovernment authorities to make decisions affecting the rights and obligations ofparties must be found in statute. However, it does seem to me that it is open to theOireachtas, in the light of the provisions of Article 28A, to confer a wide degree ofpolicy discretion on local authorities. That is not, however, to say that localauthorities are entirely at large. They operate within the parameters of an enablingstatute even though that statute may, in its terms, confer a broad policy discretionon the local authority concerned. Against those broad observations on the status oflocal authority decision making it is next necessary to turn to the case law inrelation to development plans.”116. The obligation for An Bord Pleanála to engage with the recommendation set out in thechief executive’s report is more obvious than the obligation to engage with an internalreport such as that prepared by a board inspector. This may explain why the Oireachtasconsidered it necessary to impose the express statutory obligation to do so in the case ofthe latter (section 34(10)(b) of the PDA 2000).117. Secondly, and in any event, there is an implied obligation upon a decision-maker toaddress submissions which are properly made to it. The nature of this obligation hasbeen stated as follows by the Supreme Court in Balz v. An Bord Pleanála [2019] IESC 90,[57].Page 28 ⇓“[…] It is a basic element of any decision-making affecting the public that relevantsubmissions should be addressed and an explanation given why they are notaccepted, if indeed that is the case. This is fundamental not just to the law, butalso to the trust which members of the public are required to have in decisionmaking institutions if the individuals concerned, and the public more generally, areto be expected to accept decisions with which, in some cases, they may profoundlydisagree, and with whose consequences they may have to live.”118. The above statement was made in the context of submissions made by members of thepublic in respect of an application for planning permission. It follows that the sameobligation must apply a fortiori to a statutory consultee, such as the local planningauthority, which is required to submit a formal report in prescribed form to An BordPleanála.119. Put otherwise, the recommendations in the chief executive’s report cannot have a lesserstatus than submissions made by a member of the public. Thus, notwithstanding thatthere is no express statutory provision imposing an obligation to do so, the board isrequired to address the recommendations set out in the chief executive’s report. Thisdoes not entail an obligation to produce a discursive judgment nor a point-by-pointrefutation of the statutory report. It must, however, be clear to a person reading An BordPleanála’s decision, in conjunction with the inspector’s report, as to why the planningauthority’s recommendation to refuse planning permission was not accepted.120. This obligation is consistent with the purpose which a duty to state reasons serves, asidentified by the Supreme Court in Connelly (cited earlier). Clarke C.J. formulated thelegal requirements against which the adequacy of reasons may be tested as follows.First, any person affected by a decision is entitled to know in general terms why thedecision was made. This requirement derives from the obligation to be fair to individualsaffected by binding decisions, and also contributes to transparency. Second, a person isentitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek to availof any appeal or to apply for judicial review of a decision. The reasons provided mustalso be such as to allow a court hearing an appeal or reviewing a decision to engageproperly in such an appeal or review.121. I turn now to apply these legal principles to the facts of the present case.122. It is evident from the inspector’s report that the inspector gave careful consideration tothe chief executive’s report. The reasons for the recommendation to refuse planningpermission are set out in full. The inspector addresses the reasons and explains why shedoes not accept the recommendation, as follows.123. The gist of the first recommended reason for refusal had been that the proposedresidential development would adversely affect the ability of the two existing schools toexpand. This is addressed at §12.1.7 and §12.1.8 of the inspector’s report.Page 29 ⇓“Policy SIC8 relates to both the provisions of new schools and the expansion ofexisting schools. The Department of Education has no objection to the reduction inthe size of the existing school’s campus. Should the subject planning application besuccessful, it is the applicant’s intention to transfer the ‘Option Site’ (an area to thenorth of the Primary School) to the DoES for the sole use of the primary school foreducational use.* The development of the subject site, which are privately ownedlands, does not preclude the extension of the existing schools within their sites. Itis noted that the sale of the subject lands included the provision of a new all-weather hockey pitch, which will enhance the Secondary Schools facilities. Planningpermission has been granted for this synthetic all-weather pitch on foot of Reg. Ref.ABP-302898-18. It is submitted that the DoES did not seek to purchase the landswhen they were placed on the open market by the RJM in 2017.The Development Plan does not indicate that the subject lands have been identified(and reserved) for educational development. The legal opinion from Eamon GalliganSC enclosed with the application is highlighted. Policy SIC8 makes it clear thatpotential school sites are to be identified in the Development Plan. Regard beinghad to the position of the planning authority that ‘INST’ Objective does apply to thesubject site and overall lands, I am of the opinion that it is clearly placed on theschool lands to the north of the subject lands. The lands the subject of thisapplication are zoned objective ‘A’, are in private ownership and the ‘INST’ localObjective only refers to general institutional purposes and does not amount to theidentification of the relevant lands specifically for school or educational purposes.”*Emphasis (italics) added.124. As appears, one of the factors which informed the inspector’s findings was that theapplicant for planning permission, i.e. the developer, intended to transfer an area to thenorth of the existing primary school to the Department of Education and Skill foreducational use (in the event that planning permission was granted). Crucially, theinspector recommended a planning condition to address this contingency as follows. (Thisreplicates a condition recommended as part of the chief executive’s report).“3. The area in the northeast of the campus identified as ‘Option Site’ shall be used foreducation purposes only. The area of public open space within the subject site shallbe made available for use by all users of the wider Our Lady’s Grove campus,including the schools.Reason: In the interests of providing for the existing and future needs of theeducational uses on the campus.”125. An Bord Pleanála omitted this recommended condition from its decision to grant planningpermission. This difference in approach between the board and the inspector creates aninescapable difficulty for the board in attempting to rely on the inspector’s reasoning onthis issue. At least part of the inspector’s explanation for not accepting therecommendation in the chief executive’s report to refuse planning permission had beenPage 30 ⇓that the area to the north-east would be reserved for educational use. This was to beachieved by way of the recommended condition. An Bord Pleanála chose to omit thiscondition. (This appears to be the only substantive difference between the conditionsimposed by the board, and those recommended by the inspector). The board has,however, failed to explain in its decision what approach it took to the question of thepossible future expansion of the existing schools. Indeed, it is a remarkable feature ofthe board’s formal decision that it makes no reference at all to the existing schools nor tothe implications for same of the proposed residential development. This is sonotwithstanding that this was one of the principal objections raised by the planningauthority in the chief executive’s report: the planning authority went so far as tocharacterise it as a material contravention of the development plan.126. Counsel for An Bord Pleanála sought to offer a (belated) explanation for the omission ofthe condition by suggesting that the recommended condition would be ultra vires havingregard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashbourne Holdings Ltd. v. An BordPleanála [2003] 2 IR 114 (even allowing for the subsequent amendments to the powerto attach conditions introduced by the Planning and Development (StrategicInfrastructure) Act 2006). The submission does not provide any insight as to whatapproach the board actually took to the possible future expansion of the existing schools.Even if, as suggested by counsel, An Bord Pleanála may have thought that a conditionrequiring the reservation of land for school expansion would be ultra vires, the board wasstill required to address the planning authority’s recommended reason for refusal, and toprovide an explanation as to why it was not accepted. We simply do not know, forexample, whether the board considered the land would be provided to the Department ofEducation and Skills even in the absence of a condition, or, alternatively, whether theboard considered that the future expansion of the schools might be met in some otherway. Perhaps the board took the view that it was not possible to give effect to thedevelopment plan policy.127. The one thing which is certain, however, is that the board cannot rely on the inspector’sreasoning on this issue. The inspector’s finding is predicated on the putting in place of alegal mechanism, i.e. the proposed planning condition, to ensure that the area in thenorth-east be used for educational purposes only. This plank of the reasoning fell awayonce the recommended condition was omitted.128. Finally, for the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, in a number of recentjudgments, reliance has been placed on the fact that the board imposed planningconditions in substantially the same terms as those recommended by the inspector, assupporting the inference that the board had accepted the inspector’s report. (See, forexample, Buckley v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 572, [117] and Sliabh Luachra AgainstBallydesmond Windfarm Committee v. An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 888, [114]). Itseems to follow as a corollary that where the board has omitted a recommendedcondition, which addresses a matter of significance, that the board must have differedfrom its inspector on this aspect of his or her report. (This is to be contrasted with aPage 31 ⇓scenario where the board merely makes minor revisions to the recommended conditionsor amalgamates two or more of the recommended conditions).129. The position in respect of the second and third reasons for refusal recommended in thechief executive’s report is different. The second and third reasons are concerned with theprovision of public open space and the retention of trees. The explanation for thedifference in approach between the chief executive’s report and the inspector’s report isexplicable by reference to a disagreement on the question of whether the application sitewas subject to the “institutional lands” designation. The chief executive’s report proceedson the basis that the designation does apply, and hence assesses the planning applicationby reference to the policies and objectives at §8.2.3.4 (xi) of the development plan. Bycontrast, the inspector had concluded—mistakenly—that the designation did not apply.The error, which was replicated by An Bord Pleanála, means that the decision is invalid forthe reasons set out under the previous headings above. However, insofar as the specificground of challenge now under discussion, namely the alleged failure to properly considerthe chief executive’s report, is concerned, it is clear that the inspector did engage withthese issues.130. In summary, therefore, the inspector’s report does consider and engage with the reasonsfor refusal recommended in the chief executive’s report as required under section 9(1)(a)of the PD(H)A 2016. This engagement does, however, disclose an error of law in respectof the interpretation of the development plan. Save with the exception of the issuesconcerning the implications of the proposed residential development for the possiblefuture expansion of the existing schools, the inspector’s approach can be imputed to AnBord Pleanála.131. There has been a breach of section 9(1)(a) insofar as the board has failed to explain in itsdecision what approach it took to the question of the possible future expansion of theexisting schools and as to why it disagreed with the first of the recommended reasons forrefusal.PRE-APPLICATION CONSULTATIONS132. The objector makes a number of complaints in respect of procedural steps which occurredprior to the making of the application for planning permission. In order to put thesecomplaints in context, it is necessary first to rehearse what might be described as the“pre-application procedure”.133. One of the unusual features of the PD(H)A 2016 is that it imposes a mandatoryrequirement for consultation between (i) the prospective applicant for planningpermission; (ii) An Bord Pleanála; and (iii) the local planning authority, prior to themaking of an application for planning permission. In brief, the objective of this pre-application consultation is to allow An Bord Pleanála to form an opinion as to whether ornot the documents submitted by the prospective applicant constitute a “reasonable basis”for an application. If the board’s opinion is that the documents as submitted requirefurther consideration and amendment, then the board sets out, in a notice, its advice asto the issues that need to be addressed in the documents. There is no provision for thePage 32 ⇓submission of further information once the planning application has been made, andhence the importance of ensuring that all relevant issues have been addressed inadvance.134. The PD(H)A 2016 obliges a prospective applicant to consult with the local planningauthority prior to its pre-application consultation with An Bord Pleanála. Thereafter, theplanning authority concerned must submit copies of all records of the consultation(s) heldwith the prospective applicant to the board. As explained presently, the complaint madein this case involves an allegation that this part of the procedure has not been compliedwith in full.135. A similar two-stage process, involving a pre-application consultation in advance of themaking of the planning application, is to be found in the context of the “strategicinfrastructure development” or “SID” procedure under the PDA 2000 (as inserted by thePlanning and Development (Strategic Infrastructure) Act 2006).136. The question of whether such pre-application consultations might undermine publicparticipation in the formal planning process has been considered by the Supreme Court inCallaghan v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 39; [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 373. The SupremeCourt, per Clarke C.J., emphasised that An Bord Pleanála cannot be bound or influencedby the pre-application consultation.“It seems to me to clearly follow that, unless the relevant legislation contains clearprovision to the contrary, the proper interpretation of legislation involving a twostage process must be that any matters determined at an earlier or preliminarystage where an interested party is not entitled to be heard must remain open forfull re-consideration at the stage when a final decision potentially affecting therights or obligations of any individual is to be made. It follows in turn that thedefault position in this case must be that the Board cannot be bound or influencedby its earlier decision to go down the SID route when considering the strategicimportance of the proposed development in the context of making a final decisionas to whether to grant permission.”137. The same logic applies, by analogy, to the two-stage process provided for in the case ofstrategic housing development under the PD(H)A 2016.138. The Oireachtas has been careful to ensure that the pre-application consultation process—which it will be recalled does not involve public participation—does not give rise to anyreasonable apprehension of prejudgment or predetermination on the part of the board inrespect of the subsequent planning application. The PD(H)A 2016 expressly precludesany reliance being placed on the pre-application stage in the determination of thesubsequent planning application. Section 6(9) reads as follows.(9) Neither—(a) the holding of a consultation under this section, norPage 33 ⇓(b) the forming of an opinion under this section,shall prejudice the performance by the Board, or the planning authority orauthorities in whose area or areas the proposed strategic housing developmentwould be situated, of any other of their respective functions under the Planning andDevelopment Acts 2000 to 2016, or any other enactment and cannot be relied uponin the formal planning process or in legal proceedings.139. An almost identical statutory prohibition on the placing of reliance upon pre-applicationconsultations in the formal planning process is to be found in the case of strategicinfrastructure development (section 37C of the PDA 2000), and in the case of pre-application consultations with a planning authority (section 247 of the PDA 2000). Thepractical implications of these types of prohibition have been explained as follows by theHigh Court (Haughton J.) in O’Flynn Capital Partners v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown CountyCouncil [2016] IEHC 480, [31] and [32].“It follows that, in general, reports and recommendations from planning or otherlocal authority officials prepared in the course of the formal planning process inresponse to a planning application should not rely upon advice given or received atany statutory pre-planning consultation, and in turn should not be relied upon bythe decision maker(s) when considering or determining the application.There will be some circumstances in which it may be permissible for reference to bemade to pre-planning consultations. For instance, it is difficult to see how anapplicant could realistically object to a simple listing in a planner’s report of thepre-planning consultations. It may be that documentation furnished at such ameeting, if furnished with the intention that it would used in a planning application,would not be covered by the s. 247(3) prohibition. It must also be open to anapplicant for judicial review who asserts that there was improper reliance by aplanning authority on the content of pre-planning consultations in ‘the formalplanning process’ to refer to sufficient material to support a case for breach of s.247(3). There may be other exceptional circumstances in which evidence from apre-planning consultation may be admissible, for example, where an egregiouscomment at such a meeting gives rise to an allegation of actual bias.”140. This completes the summary of the relevant statutory context. I now turn to the specificcomplaints made by the objector. It seems that three pre-application consultations wereheld by the planning authority in respect of different development proposals during theperiod 2016 to 2018. The relevant chronology is as follows.20 October 2016Pre-application consultation re: proposed 72 unitresidential development.19 July 2017Pre-application consultation re: proposed 124 unitresidential development.Page 34 ⇓14 June 2018Pre-application consultation re: proposed 132 unitresidential development.141. The minutes in respect of the second and third of these meetings had been submitted bythe planning authority to An Bord Pleanála in advance of the pre-application consultationbetween the prospective applicant; An Bord Pleanála; and the planning authority inJanuary 2019.142. The objector’s complaint is that the minutes in respect of the first meeting, on 20 October2016, had not been forwarded to An Bord Pleanála. With respect, this complaint is notwell-founded. The meeting predated the coming into force and effect of the relevantprovisions of the PD(H)A 2016 on 3 July 2017. Consequently, the meeting could not, bydefinition, be one which had been held in discharge of the obligation under section 6 ofthe PD(H)A 2016. It follows that the minutes of that meeting did not require to besubmitted to An Bord Pleanála in accordance with section 6(4). Moreover, the nature andextent of the development proposed at that time was very different from that the subjectof the application ultimately made in May 2019.143. It should also be reiterated that the minutes in respect of pre-application meetings withthe planning authority are only admissible as part of the pre-application consultationprocess mandated under section 6 of the PD(H)A 2016. Same cannot be relied upon forthe purposes of the formal planning process thereafter, i.e. in the determination of theplanning application (section 6(9)). The objector cannot therefore have suffered anyprejudice as a result of the alleged failure to submit the minutes of the 20 October 2016meeting to An Bord Pleanála.144. The objector makes a related complaint in respect of the timing of the pre-applicationconsultation in respect of the strategic housing development viz-a-viz his third-partyappeal against the first-instance decision of the planning authority to grant planningpermission for the all-weather hockey pitch. The sequence of events is as follows. Thepre-application consultation took place on 16 January 2019. As of that date, theobjector’s appeal in relation to the hockey pitch was pending before An Bord Pleanála.The appeal in respect of the hockey pitch was determined on 14 March 2019. Theapplication for the strategic housing development was submitted on 10 May 2019.145. The record of the meeting on 16 January 2019 indicates that the following comment wasmade on behalf of the board officials.“If there is an appeal on the hockey pitch an application for this site which includespart of the hockey pitch which is to be re-positioned could be deemed premature”.146. The objector appears to argue that it was prejudicial to him for An Bord Pleanála to beconsidering—even if only in the context of pre-application consultations—the possibility ofresidential development being carried out on lands which were then occupied by the(former) hockey pitch. The implication of this argument seems to be that the decision asto whether to grant or refuse planning permission for a new hockey pitch on an east-westPage 35 ⇓alignment might be influenced by considerations related to the proposed residentialdevelopment discussed at the pre-application consultation. It is submitted that the boardshould have postponed any pre-application consultation until the appeal in respect of thehockey pitch had been determined.147. With respect, any concerns in this regard are not well founded. For the reasons set outby the Supreme Court in its judgment in Callaghan v. An Bord Pleanála (cited earlier), AnBord Pleanála cannot be bound or influenced by a pre-application consultation. This holdstrue not only for the planning application made consequent upon the pre-applicationconsultation, but also for any related planning applications or appeals.148. There is no reasonable basis for suggesting that simply because An Bord Pleanála haddiscussed with the developer the possibility of a strategic housing developmentapplication, that the board would do other than determine the hockey pitch appeal on itsown merits. The objector has exhibited the decision and the inspector’s report in respectof the hockey pitch appeal. There is nothing in any of the materials before the High Courtto suggest that the board’s decision to grant planning permission for the new hockey pitchin March 2019 was in any way influenced by the pre-application consultation held inrespect of a different planning application in January 2019.HABITATS DIRECTIVE: BATS149. The application for planning permission was accompanied by an ecological impactassessment report (“the ecological report”). The ecological report indicates that there issome bat activity within the application site. No bat roosts were identified within theapplication site, but taking a precautionary approach, the site was treated as having thepotential for bat roosts. The ecological report valued the site as having a local ecologicalimportance (higher value) for bats. The ecological report then set out a series ofmitigation measures.150. The inspector’s report addresses these issues at §12.6. The inspector recommended thatconditions should be attached to the planning permission requiring (i) that the developerimplement the mitigation measures in the ecological impact assessment report; and (ii)that a suitably qualified ecologist be appointed by the developer to oversee the site set-upand construction of the proposed development.151. These recommendations were accepted by An Bord Pleanála, and the grant of planningpermission includes the following two conditions.“10. All mitigation and monitoring measures outlined in the plans and particulars,including the Ecological Impact Assessment report submitted with this applicationshall be carried out in full, except where otherwise required by conditions attachedto this permission.Reason: In the interest of protecting the environment and in the interest of publichealth.Page 36 ⇓11. A suitably qualified ecologist shall be appointed by the developer to oversee the siteset-up and construction of the proposed development and the ecologist shall bepresent on site during construction works. The ecologist shall ensure theimplementation of all proposals contained in the Schedule of Ecological proposals.Prior to commencement of development, the name and contact details of saidperson shall be submitted to the planning authority. Upon completion of works, anaudit report of the site works shall be prepared by the appointed ecologist andsubmitted to the planning authority to be kept on record.Reason: In the interest of nature conservation.”152. The objector complains that the decision to grant planning permission is contrary toarticle 12 of the EU Habitats Directive (Directive 92/43/EC). It is suggested that thecarrying out of the proposed development may result in the “deliberate disturbance” ofprotected bats species and the “deterioration or destruction” of their breeding sites orresting places. It is alleged that a condition should have been attached to the planningpermission requiring the developer to obtain a “derogation licence” under regulation 54 ofthe EC (Birds and Natural Habitats) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 477 of 2011) (whichimplements article 12 of the Habitats Directive).153. With respect, the objector’s argument appears to be predicated on a misconception as tothe interaction between the planning legislation and the Birds and Natural HabitatsRegulations. The existence of a grant of planning permission does not obviate therequirement to comply with other statutory codes. This is confirmed by section 10(6) ofthe PD(H)A 2016.“(6) A person shall not be entitled solely by reason of a permission under section 9 tocarry out any development.”154. The grant of planning permission merely confirms that the statutory requirements underthe planning legislation have been complied with. Accordingly, the fact that An BordPleanála has granted permission does not obviate the need for the developer to apply fora “derogation licence” in circumstances where required. Had An Bord Pleanála included acondition stating that a “derogation licence” must be applied for where required, thecondition would merely be replicating a legal obligation that subsists in any event.155. On the facts of the present case, there is nothing in the materials before An Bord Pleanálawhich indicates that there is a likelihood that the carrying out of the proposeddevelopment will result in any of the type of activities which would necessitate a“derogation licence”.156. The mitigation measures identified in the ecological impact assessment report require thatpotential bat roost trees are inspected by an experienced ecologist for the presence ofbats prior to felling and are section-felled using controlled rigging under the supervision ofan experienced ecologist. In the event that bats are present, then the relevant works willhave to cease and it would be necessary to apply for a “derogation licence” at that stage.Page 37 ⇓SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS157. An Bord Pleanála erred in law in its interpretation of the development plan. On its properinterpretation, the “institutional lands” designation applied to the lands the subject-matterof the planning application, i.e. the application site. The entire of the lands, includingwhat is now the application site, had been in the ownership and occupation of thereligious congregation as of the date of the adoption of the 2016–2022 development plan(March 2016). The application site accommodated part of the hockey pitch associatedwith the secondary school, and open lands in institutional use. As recognised by An BordPleanála in its decision of March 2019 to grant planning permission for a new all-weatherhockey pitch, the former hockey pitch continued to have an established use for sports andrecreation, and this use was ancillary to an institutional use.158. The relevant policies and objectives of the development plan are intended to inform thedetermination of planning applications which seek permission to authorise a materialchange in the use of lands which have an established use as “institutional lands”. Thesepolicies and objectives cannot be by-passed by the simple expedient of the sale of thelands. The application site remained subject to the “institutional lands” designationnotwithstanding the transfer of the ownership of the lands from the religious congregationto the developer in October 2017.159. The proposed development involves a material contravention of the development planpolicies and objectives applicable to institutional lands in respect of (i) housing densityand (ii) public open space. The decision to grant planning permission is invalid incircumstances where An Bord Pleanála did not seek to invoke its statutory power to grantplanning permission in material contravention of the development plan (section 9(6)(c) ofthe PD(H)A 2016).160. The inspector’s report does consider and engage with the reasons for refusalrecommended in the chief executive’s report, as required under section 9(1)(a) of thePD(H)A 2016. This engagement does, however, disclose an error of law in respect of theinterpretation of the development plan. Save with the exception of the issues concerningthe implications of the proposed residential development for the possible future expansionof the existing schools, the inspector’s approach can be imputed to An Bord Pleanála.161. There has been a breach of section 9(1)(a) insofar as the board has failed to explain in itsdecision what approach it took to the question of the possible future expansion of theexisting schools and as to why it disagreed with the first of the recommended reasons forrefusal set out in the chief executive’s report.162. The grounds of challenge in respect of pre-application consultations and the HabitatsDirective have not been made out.FORM OF ORDER163. The decision to grant planning permission is invalid and an order of certiorari will be madesetting aside An Bord Pleanála’s decision of 15 August 2019.Page 38 ⇓164. If any party intends to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant tosection 50A(7) of the PDA 2000, then the draft points of law in respect of which leave issought must be filed in the Central Office and circulated to the other parties withintwenty-eight days of the date of this judgment.165. The proceedings will be adjourned to a date convenient to the parties to address the issueof costs and any application to remit the matter to An Bord Pleanála pursuant to Order84, rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. A date will also be fixed for the hearing ofany application for leave to appeal.AppearancesMichael Redmond, the applicant for judicial review, represented himselfNuala Butler, SC and Fintan Valentine for An Bord Pleanála instructed by FieldfisherSolicitorsEamon Galligan, SC and Suzanne Murray for the notice party developer instructed byCannon SolicitorsIsabelle Aylmer for the planning authorityAPPENDIXPolicies and objective of the 2016–2022 development plan applicable to institutionallands2.1.3.5 Policy RES5: Institutional LandsWhere distinct parcels of land are in institutional use (such as education, residential orother such uses) and are proposed for redevelopment, it is Council policy to retain theopen character and/or recreational amenity of these lands wherever possible, subject tothe context of the quantity of provision of existing open space in the general environs.It is recognised that many institutions in Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown are undergoing changefor various reasons. Protecting and facilitating the open and landscaped ‘parkland’settings and the activities of these institutions is encouraged. Where a well establishedinstitution plans to close, rationalise or relocate, the Council will endeavour to reserve theuse of the lands for other institutional uses, especially if the site has an open andlandscaped setting and recreational amenities are provided. Where no demand for analternative institutional use is evident or foreseen, the Council may permit alternativeuses subject to the zoning objectives of the area and the open character of the landsbeing retained.A minimum open space provision of 25% of the total site area (or a population basedprovision in accordance with Section 8.2.8.2 whichever is the greater) will be required onInstitutional Lands. This provision must be sufficient to maintain the open character ofthe site with development proposals structured around existing features and layout,particularly by reference to retention of trees, boundary walls and other features asconsidered necessary by the Council (Refer also to Section 8.2.3.4(xi) and 8.2.8).Page 39 ⇓In the development of such lands, average net densities should be in the region of 35 -50 units p/ha. In certain instances higher densities will be allowed where it isdemonstrated that they can contribute towards the objective of retaining the opencharacter and/or recreational amenities of the lands.In cases of rationalisation of an existing institutional use, as opposed to the completecessation of that use, the possible need for the future provision of additional facilitiesrelated to the residual retained institutional use retained on site may require to be takeninto account. (This particularly applies to schools where a portion of the site has beendisposed of but a school use remains on the residual part of the site.)8.2.3.4 Additional Accommodation in Existing Built-up Areas(xi) Institutional LandsWhere no demand for an alternative institutional use is evident or foreseen, the Councilmay permit alternative uses subject to the area’s zoning objectives and the opencharacter of the lands being retained.There are still a number of large institutions in the established suburbs of the Countywhich may be subject to redevelopment pressures in the coming years. The principalaims of any eventual redevelopment of these lands will be to achieve a sustainableamount of development while ensuring the essential setting of the lands and the integrityof the main buildings are retained. In order to promote a high standard of development acomprehensive masterplan should accompany a planning application for institutional sites.Such a masterplan must adequately take account of the built heritage and natural assetsof a site and established recreational use patterns. Public access to all or some of thelands may be required. Every planning application lodged on institutional lands shallclearly demonstrate how they conform with the agreed masterplan for the overall site.Should any proposed development deviate from the agreed masterplan then a revisedmasterplan shall be agreed with the Planning Authority.A minimum open space provision of 25% of the total site area (or a population basedprovision in accordance with Section 8.2.8.2 whichever is the greater) will be required onInstitutional Lands. This provision must be sufficient to maintain the open character ofthe site – with development proposals built around existing features and layout,particularly by reference to retention of trees, boundary walls and other features asconsidered necessary by the Council.In addition to the provision of adequate open space, on Institutional Lands where existingschool uses will be retained, any proposed residential development shall have regard tothe future needs of the school and allow sufficient space to be retained adjacent to theschool for possible future school expansion/ redevelopment.8.2.8.2 Public/Communal Open Space – QuantityPage 40 ⇓To provide existing and future communities with adequate active recreational and passiveleisure opportunities the Council will employ a flexible approach to the delivery of publicopen space/communal open space and more intensive recreational/amenity/communityfacilities.The overarching hierarchy of public open spaces across the County is set out in PolicyOSR3 in Section 4.2.2.2. The hierarchy of existing parks and open spaces within theCounty have also been mapped to differentiate this hierarchical classification (Refer alsoto Appendix 14).The Planning Authority will require public6 and/or communal open space to be providedwithin new residential and large scale commercial developments. This should preferablybe located at specific sites or locations that would facilitate the assembly of areas ofsatisfactory size or usability or would enhance established on-site features.Applicants for all new developments are encouraged to engage with the PlanningAuthority at pre-planning stage to discuss the Open Space requirements for a specificsite.(i) Residential / Housing Developments Open Space:For all developments with a residential component – 5+ units – the requirement of 15sq.m- 20 sq.m. of Open Space per person shall apply based on the number ofresidential/housing units. For calculation purposes, open space requirements shall bebased on a presumed occupancy rate of 3.5 persons in the case of dwellings with three ormore bedrooms and 1.5 persons in the case of dwellings with two or fewer bedrooms. Alower quantity of open space (below 20 sq.m per person) will only be consideredacceptable in instances where exceptionally high quality open space is provided on siteand such schemes may be subject to financial contributions as set out under Section8.2.8.2 (iii) below.The Planning Authority shall require an absolute default minimum of 10% of the overallsite area for all residential developments to be reserved for use as Public Open and/orCommunal Space irrespective of the occupancy parameters set out in the previousparagraph.It is Council Policy to retain the open space context of Institutional Lands whichincorporate significant established recreational or amenity uses, as far as is practicable. Inthe event of permission for development being granted on these lands, open spaceprovision in excess of the normal standards will be required to maintain the opencharacter of such parts of the land as are considered necessary by the Council. For thispurpose a minimum open space provision of 25% of the total site area – or a population-based provision in accordance with the above occupancy criteria – will be required,whichever is the greater. There may also be a requirement to provide open space inexcess of the 25% if an established school use is to be retained on site in order tofacilitate the future needs of the school (refer also to Section 8.2.3.4(xi)).Page 41 ⇓Chief Executive’s report: recommended reasons for refusal1. The proposed development, by virtue of its bringing about a scenario whereby lands thatwere previously available to the two schools on the overall Our Lady’s Grove campuswould be made permanently unavailable to those schools, would result in a situationwhereby the existing schools on site would be operating on sites that would be smallerthan those recommended under Technical Guidance Documents TGD–025 and TGD–027as produced by the Department of Education and Skills. As such, the proposeddevelopment would be contrary to the ‘Code of Practice on the Provision of Schools andthe Planning System’, prepared jointly by the Department of Environment, Heritage, andLocal Government and the Department of Education and Science in 2008, and byextension would be contrary to Section 8.2.12.4 of the Dun Laoghaire Rathdown CountyDevelopment Plan 2016–2022, which references this Code of Practice. Furthermore, andby extension, the proposed development would result in a scenario whereby the campuswould be unavailable to address the identified demand for school places in the area byway of expansion. As such, the proposed development would be contrary to Policy SIC8,and Section 8.2.12.4 of the County Development Plan, and indeed the zoning objective to‘protect and-or improve residential amenity’ of which the provision of communityfacilities, including schools, forms part. As such the proposed development wouldmaterially contravene the County Development Plan and would be contrary to the properplanning and sustainable development of the area.2. The proposed development, by virtue of reducing the provided and potential public openspace across the Our Lady’s Grove campus to a level below 25%, and by virtue of theremoval of the vast majority of trees from within the subject-site, would be contrary toSection 8.2.3.4 (xi) of the Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Development Plan 2016–2022.3. The proposed development would be deficient in terms of the quantity and quality ofpublic open space available to the residents of the scheme, as required under Section8.2.8.2 of the Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Development Plan 2016–2022.”
Result: No result given
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